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An Article I Theory of the Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts 
Benjamin H. Barton1 
A proper understanding of the nature of the inherent powers begins with 
separating whether the judiciary has any constitutional power to overrule 
Congress from the judiciary’s power to act in the absence of congressional 
action, i.e. in the interstices of federal statutes and rules.  Separating out these 
two very different types of powers helps clarify that the inherent powers of 
federal courts are actually both broader and shallower than have been 
previously thought: Congress has near plenary authority in this area, but the 
courts have a great deal of leeway to act when Congress has not. 
 
An examination of the history and text of the Constitution, the ratification 
debates, and the earliest cases establishes that it is Article I’s necessary and 
proper clause, not Article III’s “judicial power” or “courts,” which controls any 
inherent judicial authority.  As such, Congress has near plenary authority over 
the structure and procedure of the federal courts. 
 
With the power of Congress in mind, however, the judiciary has substantial 
authority to act when Congress has not.  The Framers created a remarkably 
flexible judicial branch based upon the way common law courts operated in the 
late-18th century.  Those courts regularly acted in the absence of legislative 
authority in a multitude of ways, bound by the common law and current 
practice, but not by legislative silence.  Thus, as long as a federal court’s use of 
the inherent power has not been foreclosed by an existing Act of Congress and 
is reflective of the judicial power – i.e. helpful to the deciding of cases – courts 
are empowered to act, as long as they understand that Congress can always fix 
what it does not like.  
 
This analysis also best explains what courts have done since the framing.  While 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly claimed an inherent power strong enough to 
invalidate a congressional act in dicta, it has never actually invalidated one, 
even in situations where Congress has substantially impinged upon traditional 
areas of inherent power like rule making or contempt.  This understanding of 
congressional and judicial power thus offers an elegant solution to the thorny 
problem of inherent powers and squares the circle by fitting a unified theory to 
the history, language and structure of the Constitution and the more modern, 
pro-judiciary case law.  
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 The nature of the inherent powers of federal courts2 – whether they are 
constitutional or not, whether Congress can curtail some or all of them, and how far 
they extend – have bedeviled courts and commentators for years.  The Supreme 
Court, for example, has offered remarkably different versions of congressional 
authority in this area, occasionally in the same case.3  Sometimes the Court seems 
remarkably quiescent, suggesting that Congress’ authority is superior.  In Bank of 
Nova Scotia v. United States,4 the Court held that a federal judge could not disregard 
an otherwise valid Rule of Criminal Procedure pursuant to its inherent powers: “[i]t 
follows that Rule 52 is, in every pertinent respect, as binding as any statute duly 
enacted by Congress, and federal courts have no more discretion to disregard the 
                                                        
2
  Since United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) the Supreme Court has stated that “[c]ertain 
implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution.”  Id. at 
34.   Hudson’s 1812 list of these powers includes the powers to “fine for contempt – imprison for 
contumacy – [and] inforce [sic] the observance of order.”  Id.   
 
Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32 (1991) has a more recent and complete list: to “impose silence, respect, 
and decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates”; to “control admission to its bar 
and to discipline attorneys”; to “punish for contempts”; to “vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud 
has been perpetrated upon the court”; to “dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens”; to “act 
sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute”; “to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which 
abuses the judicial process”; and “to clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of 
the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties.”  Id. at 43-45.  Some other examples include the dismissal of a 
criminal appeal when the defendant became a fugitive, Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876), or the 
power to appoint an auditor or other expert when necessary.  In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310-13 (1920).  
The various “supervisory power” cases, see, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), are also 
best understood as inherent power cases.  See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in 
Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1433, 1468-78 (1984); Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct In 
Federal Court Practice, 58 S.M.U. L. Rev.  3, 20 (2004) (“The notion of ‘supervisory powers’ – which 
functions as a special form or subset of inherent powers – appears to give courts greater latitude in 
imposing sanctions on attorneys who appear before the court.”).  
3
  See, e.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43-47 (stating both that the “exercise of the inherent power of lower 
federal courts can be limited by statute and rule, for these courts were created by act of Congress” and that 
“[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their 
institution,” powers “which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise 
of all others”).  
4
  487 U.S. 250 (1988). 
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Rule's mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory provisions.”5  
The Court has been even more explicit in the various “supervisory power” cases:6 
“the power to judicially create and enforce nonconstitutional rules of procedure and 
evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of 
Congress.  Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any 
judicially created rules.”7 
Elsewhere the Court has adopted a more muscular stance, noting that while 
the contempt power “may be regulated within limits not precisely defined,” it can 
“neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative.”8  The Court has also 
held that it will not “lightly assume” that a congressional Act displaces a court's 
inherent power.9  These cases suggest that there are core constitutional inherent 
powers that Congress cannot abrogate and that Congress may face some sort of 
“plain statement” rule in order to legislate in the area of inherent powers. 
 Nor has the Court been clear about the exact boundaries of these powers.  
The Court has repeatedly suggested that courts should exercise “restraint and 
discretion”10 and that inherent powers are powers that are “necessary to the 
                                                        
5
  Id. at 255.  For other examples, see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985) (“Even a sensible and 
efficient use of the supervisory power . . . is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory 
provisions.”) and Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823-24 (1996) (“In many instances the inherent 
powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule.”).  
6
  These cases are discussed at greater length infra notes __ and accompanying text.  For an excellent 
overview of the supervisory power, see Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 328-33 (2006). 
7
  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).  
8
  Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924). 
9
  Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996); see also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47 (“[W]e do not 
lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles such as the scope of a 
court's inherent power.”). 
10
  Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (“Because inherent powers are shielded from 
direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion.”); Degen, 517 U.S. at 823-
24 (“The extent of these powers must be delimited with care, for there is a danger of overreaching when 
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exercise of all others.”11  Nevertheless, even a cursory review of the cases 
establishes that these powers clearly reach beyond what is strictly “necessary” into 
many applications that are merely helpful.12   
 The scholarship has likewise proven turbid.  Some recent scholarship has 
argued that inherent powers should be limited to strict necessity and should be 
constitutionally based.  For example, Robert Pushaw divided inherent powers into 
constitutionally based “implied indispensible” powers that Congress cannot impair 
or destroy and “beneficial” powers, which cannot be exercised without 
congressional approval.13  William Van Alstyne,14 Elizabeth Lear,15 Sara Beale16 and 
Amy Barrett17 have reached various, but similar conclusions. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
one branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction from the others, undertakes to 
define its own authority. . . .  Principles of deference counsel restraint in resorting to inherent power and 
require its use to be a reasonable response to the problems and needs that provoke it.”). 
11
  Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43; see also Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 819 (1987); Cheff v. 
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 392 (1966). 
12
  See, e.g., Amy Cohen Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 879-82 (2008); Joseph J. 
Anclien, The Broader the Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
37, 44-51 (2008). 
13
  Robert J. Pushaw, The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 735, 847-48 (2001).  Beneficial inherent powers “are helpful, useful or convenient in implementing 
Article III.”  While Pushaw considers the creation and exercise of these powers as unconstitutional, he 
recognizes that the “unilateral exercise of beneficial powers has become so entrenched” that it is 
“unrealistic to suggest repudiation.”  Id. at 849.  Nevertheless, at the very least “federal judges should be 
required to state clearly when they are asserting a power that is merely beneficial and to recognize plenary 
congressional control in this area.” Id. 
14
  William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining the Incidental Powers of the President 
and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 122-29 (1976) (arguing that any inherent power “broader than a power deemed 
indispensible to enable a court to proceed with a given case appears to require statutory support”).  
15
  Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier 
of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1162-63 (2006) (discussing inherent power and forum non 
conveniens and following Pushaw’s basic premise). 
16
  Beale, supra note __, at 1520-22 (arguing that a sub-species of inherent power, the “supervisory power” 
over federal criminal cases, has been applied over-broadly and should be limited to specific constitutional 
or statutory bases). 
17
  Barrett, supra note __, at 817-20 (arguing that courts have a common law power to make procedural law 
and that some of that power is constitutional and cannot be overridden by Congress). 
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In comparison, some commentators have argued for a much stronger version 
of constitutional inherent authority, in which the judiciary has substantially more 
power than Congress in the area.  Linda Mullenix has argued that congressional 
involvement in judicial rule making is an unconstitutional incursion into judicial 
inherent power.18  David Engdahl has argued that Congress may not pass legislation 
“subverting” the judiciary and that the judiciary itself should make this 
determination: “the judicial branch must decide for itself whether any act of 
Congress regarding the judicial branch actually does help effectuate the judicial 
power” and if it does not, the court should overturn the law.19  In short, there is 
substantial scholarly consensus that a strong, constitutionally based inherent power 
exists as a potential check on congressional action.20 
A proper understanding of the nature of the inherent powers begins by 
distinguishing two questions: 1) whether the judiciary has any constitutional power 
to overrule Congress, and 2) can the judiciary act in the absence of congressional 
approval, i.e. in the interstices of federal statutes and rules.  Separating these two 
very different types of powers helps clarify that the inherent powers of federal 
                                                        
18
  Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of 
Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1287-88 (1993).  Similarly, Daniel Meador extrapolated an “inherent 
judicial authority [that] is broad indeed” from an understanding of English courts at the time of the framing 
of Article III.  Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. 
REV. 1805, 1805-07 (1995).  Michael Martin has argued that the judiciary has constitutional control over 
some rules of evidence under the inherent powers doctrine, see Michael M. Martin, Inherent Judicial 
Power: Flexibility Congress did not Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEX. L. REV. 167, 179-80 
(1979). 
19
  David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 75, 164 (1999) (“Judiciary laws must not be disregarded simply because they are less useful than 
alternatives the judges might prefer; but when the judges find such a law detrimental to judicial potency, 
they may disregard it as beyond Congress' power.”).  Interestingly, Engdahl agrees with this Article that the 
necessary and proper clause of Article I is the correct constitutional control on Congress’ power in this 
area.  Id. at 90-104.  Nevertheless, he disagrees with this Article that courts must apply the traditional, and 
much looser, “reasonable basis” test under the necessary and proper clause and argues for more muscular 
and far reaching review.  Id. at 164-75. 
20
  See Barrett, supra note __, at 833-35 (discussing the boundaries of this consensus). 
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courts are actually both broader and shallower than have been previously thought: 
Congress has near plenary authority in this area, but the courts have a great deal of 
leeway to act when Congress has not. 
An examination of the history and text of the Constitution, the ratification 
debates, and the earliest cases establishes that it is Article I’s necessary and proper 
clause, not Article III’s “judicial power” or “courts,” which controls any inherent 
judicial authority.  As such, Congress has near plenary authority over the structure 
and procedure of the federal courts.  This understanding is at odds with the existing 
scholarship, which has generally argued that the words “judicial power” and 
“courts” in Article III grant federal courts a substantial and impenetrable set of core 
inherent powers that Congress cannot disturb.21 
With the power of Congress in mind, however, the judiciary has substantial 
authority to act when Congress has not.  This Article establishes this authority by 
again examining the historical record and the nature and structure of courts and 
“judicial power” at the time of the framing.  The Framers of the Constitution created 
a remarkably flexible judicial branch based upon the way common law courts 
operated in the late-18th century.  Those courts regularly acted in the absence of 
legislative authority in a multitude of ways, bound by the common law and current 
practice, but not by legislative silence.  Thus, as long as a federal court’s use of the 
inherent power has not been foreclosed by an existing Act of Congress and is 
                                                        
21
  See, e.g., Pushaw, supra, note __, at 847-48 (describing this constitutionally protected area as the 
“implied indispensible” powers); Barrett, supra note __, at 844-45 (2008) (arguing that “there are some – 
albeit few – procedural matters that are entirely beyond congressional regulation”); Lear, supra note __, at 
1162-63 (discussing inherent power and forum non conveniens and describing a core inherent authority that 
cannot be abrogated by Congress). 
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reflective of the judicial power – i.e. helpful to the deciding of cases – courts are 
empowered to act, as long as they understand that Congress can always fix what it 
does not like.  Again, the bulk of the scholarship in the area argues against such a 
broad reading of these powers.22 
Thus, the constitutional protections of the judicial inherent powers are 
narrow indeed, but the judiciary’s non-constitutional gap-filling power is quite 
broad.  This understanding of the inherent powers of federal courts best fits the 
history and purpose of the Constitution.  This analysis also best explains what courts 
have done since the framing.  While the Supreme Court has repeatedly claimed an 
inherent power strong enough to invalidate a congressional act in dicta, it has never 
actually invalidated one, even in situations where Congress has substantially 
impinged upon traditional areas of inherent power like rule making or contempt.23  
As for the breadth of the interstitial powers, the Court has approved a dizzying array 
of uses of the inherent power in areas of congressional silence, frequently explicitly 
noting Congress’ power to overrule these decisions if Congress so chooses.24 
This understanding of congressional and judicial power offers an elegant 
solution to the thorny problem of inherent powers.  There is no doubt that federal 
courts have claimed inherent and supervisory powers that are not strictly necessary 
                                                        
22
  See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note __, at 122-29; Beale, supra note __, at 1520-22 (arguing that a sub-
species of inherent power, the “supervisory power” over federal criminal cases, has been applied over-
broadly and should be limited to specific constitutional or statutory bases); Barrett, supra note __, at 387 
(arguing that the Supreme Court likely lacks constitutional authority to impose supervisory rules on lower 
courts because the Article III terms “supreme” and “inferior” were meant to bind Congress, not empower 
the Supreme Court). 
23
  See Section IV.A.1 infra. 
24
  See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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to the existence of the courts.25  This means that any inherent powers theory must 
either find a constitutional basis for these actions or must conclude that they are all 
unconstitutional judicial overreaching.  Likewise, any inherent powers theory that 
claims a strong constitutional inherent power that can overrule congressional action 
must explain away some critical constitutional language.  Article I’s necessary and 
proper clause explicitly grants Congress the power to “make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution” the powers vested in the 
Judiciary.  Article III’s inferior courts clause likewise grants Congress the power to 
establish (or not establish), design, add to, subtract from, or disestablish the lower 
federal judiciary.  Taken together, these clauses (as well as Congress’ great power 
over the structure and nature of the Supreme Court) leave little room for judicial 
hegemony over inherent authority.  
This is not to say that Congress is utterly unbound.  Two boundaries exist.  
First, there is a “pure judicial power” – the power to render a final decision after 
applying the law to the facts – which Congress cannot trample.26  So neither 
Congress nor the executive can interfere with adjudication itself.  For example, in 
Hayburn’s Case27 the Court struck down a federal statute that allowed the Secretary 
of War and Congress to review circuit judge decisions in pension cases for disabled 
                                                        
25
  See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
26
  Pushaw, supra note __, at 843-67; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of 
Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 415-27 (1996).  James Liebman and 
William Ryan canvassed the drafting history of Article III and Supreme Court case law and stated the 
following “five crucial qualities constituting ‘[t]he judicial Power’: (1) independent decision of (2) every – 
and the entire – question affecting the normative scope of supreme law (3) based on the whole supreme 
law; (4) finality of decision, subject only to reversal by a superior court in the Article III hierarchy; and (5) 
a capacity to effectuate the court's judgment in the case and in precedentially controlled cases.” James S. 
Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking 
Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 884 (1998). 
27
  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). 
 9 
veterans.28  The statute’s interference with the finality of judicial decision as well as 
the granting of essentially appellate jurisdiction to non-Article III courts was 
unconstitutional.29   
The necessary and proper clause itself is the second boundary to 
Congressional power.  Thus, Congress could not pass a law that makes it impossible 
for the judiciary to do its work.  Nevertheless, this boundary on congressional power 
is much narrower than that suggested by those arguing for a strong constitutional 
inherent powers doctrine.  As the Court’s long history of upholding congressional 
acts under the necessary and proper clause shows,30 this boundary offers Congress 
very broad authority over the judiciary in the area of court structure and procedure. 
This resolution thus squares the circle: under Article I Congress has near 
plenary constitutional and legislative authority, but courts retain broad authority to 
act where Congress has not.  The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I canvasses the 
language and structure of the Constitution, the framing of the Constitution, the early 
statutory structure and the early case law and argues that Congress has near 
plenary power over court processes and procedure.  Part II canvasses the same 
sources to argue that federal courts retained the common law power to act in the 
interstices of congressional silence.  Part III describes the limits to both 
congressional and judicial power over this area.  Part IV argues that this dual 
                                                        
28
  Id. at 410 n. d.  For a more recent example, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
29
  Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n. d.  Interestingly, in Hayburn the Court noted that the 
legislature “unquestionably possess[es]” the power to establish “courts in such a manner as to their wisdom 
shall appear best, limited by the terms of the constitution only; and to whatever extent that power may be 
exercised, or however severe the duty they may think proper to require, the judges, when appointed in 
virtue of any such establishment, owe implicit and unreserved obedience to it.”  Id.  This quote echoes 
multiple other contemporary Supreme Court cases recognizing Congress’ power in this area.  See infra 
notes __ and accompanying text. 
30
  See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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understanding of inherent powers snugly fits the existing inherent powers case law.  
The Article concludes by noting that courts should better recognize Congress’ 
superior power in this area and adjust their inherent powers language accordingly.  
I. CONGRESS’ PLENARY ARTICLE I POWER  
The key to understanding the inherent power of the courts is to recognize 
that Article I’s “necessary and proper” clause grants Congress near plenary power 
over court process and structure.  The language, structure and history of the 
Constitution, while not unequivocal, more clearly support the view that Congress 
has full power to create, design and regulate the federal judiciary, especially for the 
lower federal courts.31  This Part starts with the language and structure of the 
Constitution, and then turns to the framing, the ratification debates, the early 
statutory scheme and the early case law.  These sources confirm Congress’ near 
plenary power over the areas traditionally covered by the inherent powers doctrine. 
 A.  The Language and Structure of the Constitution  
 The natural starting place is the language and structure of the Constitution 
itself.  One of the principle constitutional innovations was the concept of a federal 
government of limited and enumerated powers.32  If a branch of the federal 
government claims any power, that power must be rooted in the language of the 
                                                        
31
  The Supreme Court is on a somewhat different footing, because it is the only federal court required by 
the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1873) 
(noting that Congress can unquestionably restrict the contempt power for lower courts because “[t]hese 
courts were created by act of Congress,” but the power to “limit the authority of the Supreme Court, which 
derives its existence and powers from the Constitution, may perhaps be a matter of doubt”).  Nevertheless, 
the language, structure and history of the Constitution suggest substantial congressional control over the 
Supreme Court as well.  See infra Section I.A-I.E.  
32
  See, e.g., Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 427 (2004) (“The American Constitution was unique in creating a federal 
government of limited and enumerated powers and retaining considerable authority for the states.”). 
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Constitution itself; there are no general or universal powers in the federal 
government.33  Over the years all three branches of the federal government have 
successfully claimed various “implied” powers, but these powers must be incidental 
to an enumerated power.34 
 Thus, if the federal courts have any “inherent powers,” the Constitution must 
explicitly or implicitly grant the power in either Article I or Article III.  Two clauses 
in Article I apply to the question of inherent powers.  The necessary and proper 
clause grants Congress the power “To make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers 
vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any 
department or officer thereof.”35  The inferior tribunals clause grants Congress the 
power  “To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”36 
Article III discusses “the judicial power” in regard to “courts” twice.  In 
Article III, Section 1: “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish”37 and again in Section 2:  
                                                        
33
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 102 (James Madison) (Willmore Kendall and Geroge W. Carey, eds., 1966) 
(“In the first place it is to be remembered, that the general government is not to be charged with the whole 
power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which 
concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of 
any.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note __, at 292 (James Madison)  (“The powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain to the 
state governments are numerous and indefinite.”); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 
(1805) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[I]t has been truly said that under a constitution conferring specific powers, the 
power contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised.”). 
34
  For an excellent and mercifully brief account of the implied powers doctrine, see William W. Van 
Alstyne, Implied Powers, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 964-65 (Leonard W. Levy 
et al. eds., 1986). 
35
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
36
  Id. 
37
  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other 
public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to 
controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of 
another state; between citizens of different states; between citizens of the 
same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a 
state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.38   
 
Article III is thus silent on any inherent powers for the federal judiciary. 
 Article I, however, is not silent.  The necessary and proper clause explicitly 
grants Congress the authority to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.”39  Article I, Section 8 leaves little 
room for the judiciary (or any other part of the government) to claim any inherent 
authority that is superior to Congress’.  As we shall see below, this does not mean 
that the courts can never act in the absence of congressional approval.  It does, 
however, mean that Congress has the power to make laws “necessary and proper” 
to the exercise of the judicial power and that it is facially inconsistent with Article I 
to suggest that Article III grants any federal court an inherent power superior to 
Congress’.  As long as congressional action passes the low “necessary and proper” 
bar, Congress has plenary Article I authority to pass the laws it pleases.  Without any 
examination of the statements of the Framers or the early case law, the idea of a 
strong constitutional judicial inherent power runs immediately aground of the 
necessary and proper clause.  
This seems especially true given Article III’s description of the “judicial 
power.”  First, unlike the legislative or executive power, the judicial power is thinly 
                                                        
38
  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
39
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). 
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described.40  There is a quite explicit description of jurisdiction, i.e. which cases are 
subject to the “judicial power,” but the parameters of the power itself, how it is to be 
exercised and by whom is largely undefined.  In light of the necessary and proper 
clause’s broad grant of power to Congress, the silence in Article III strongly suggests 
that Congress has plenary Article I power over the nature, shape and reach of the 
federal judiciary.  Article III does require the creation of a Supreme Court of some 
size, shape and nature, but outside of that Court’s mandatory jurisdiction the 
Constitution leaves everything else to Congress.41  
Congress has particularly far reaching power over the lower federal courts, 
as Congress has an explicit power to create, or choose not to create, any inferior 
courts.  The judicial power is “vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior 
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”42  From a modern 
perspective there are several remarkable aspects of this power.  It is hard to 
imagine now given the size and nature of the federal judiciary, but Congress could 
have chosen to create only the Supreme Court and could have left all federal 
jurisdiction (other than the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction and possibly their 
appellate jurisdiction) to the state courts.   
Further, this power of creation does not assume that Congress will institute a 
federal judiciary and be finished: Congress is explicitly empowered to “ordain and 
establish” inferior courts “from time to time.”  The clear implication of this clause is 
                                                        
40
  Compare U.S. CONST. art. III with U.S. CONST. art I and U.S. CONST. art II.  
41
  U.S. CONST. art. III is silent on virtually all logistical aspects of the Court.  The Judiciary Act of 1789, 
ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 and the Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93 certainly also reflect Congress’ plenary 
power to create and shape the Supreme Court. 
42
  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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that Congress is expected to add (and subtract) from the inferior courts over time 
and suggests a congressional power to explore and even experiment.  The “time to 
time” language also means that Congress has the power to dismantle the lower 
federal judiciary altogether (although any displaced Article III judges might still 
need to be compensated).43 
Based on this reading of Article I and Article III the notion of a strong 
constitutional inherent power in the federal courts is somewhat puzzling.  Courts 
and commentators have found such a power by appealing to the words “judicial 
power” or “courts” in Article III.44  Under this argument the use of the words 
“judicial power” and “courts” in Article III naturally includes some idea of what a 
“court” vested with the “judicial power” looks like, and any such court must include 
those necessary to the exercise of all others.  In United States v. Hudson, the Court 
first expressed a version of this argument: “Certain implied powers must necessarily 
result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution . . . powers which 
cannot be dispensed with in a Court.”45  
This argument involves two separate steps and one does not necessarily 
require the other.  It can be true that courts “no doubt possess powers not 
immediately derived from statute,” but not true that these powers “cannot be 
                                                        
43
  Of course, even paying the displaced judges is not guaranteed.  At the turn of the nineteenth century in a 
partisan struggle between the federalist and republican parties, Congress abolished some Article III courts 
and did not continue to employ the displaced judges, apparently on the theory that Article III tenure did not 
survive the disestablishment of the underlying court.  See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS 3-
52; 76-82 (1971).  In comparison, when Congress disbanded the ill-fated Article III Commerce Court it 
found other court positions for the displaced judges.  See WILLIAM S. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 78-100 (1918). 
44
  Robert Pushaw has written the definitive version of this argument.  See Pushaw, supra note __, at 741; 
see also Barrett, supra note __, at 843-44; Anclien, supra note __, at 42-43. 
45
  United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). 
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dispensed with in a Court” or that such powers are constitutionally based and 
superior to Congress’ power.  As argued below in Part II, it is hard to imagine that 
the Framers meant to limit the activities and powers of courts to only those 
explicitly enumerated by Congress.   
Nevertheless, that interstitial power need not be constitutionally superior to 
Congress’.  Remember that a strong constitutional inherent power necessarily 
means that the judiciary’s power over procedure and court structure outweighs 
congressional power.  This argument either ignores or elides the Article I power to 
“make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” the 
judicial power, and Congress’ absolute right to create, disestablish, add or subtract 
from the lower judiciary (and the power to design the Supreme Court).  This 
argument also proceeds without the benefit of any plain statement of judicial power 
over procedure or contempt in either Article I or III.   
Any implied constitutional power must piggyback on an enumerated power 
without eviscerating any other enumerated power.  The difficulty with implying a 
strong inherent power is that the words “judicial power” and “courts” cannot imply 
a power superior to Congress’ explicitly granted Article I power.  Moreover, in 
addition to the language of the Constitution itself, the words of the Framers, the 
early case law and the first acts of Congress all support the opposite conclusion. 
B.  The Framing of the Constitution  
There is nothing in the history of Article I and Article III that explicitly 
answers the question of the nature (or even the existence) of federal court inherent 
powers, but there is much in the periphery to support congressional control over 
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court processes.  The various commentators who have looked at the question of 
inherent powers have reached different conclusions, but generally agree on one 
point: “Records of the Constitutional Convention and discussions at the time of 
ratification do not help define the judicial power of the federal courts.”46  Inherent 
powers are never mentioned or discussed.  As per usual, there are two narratives to 
draw from the silence of the Constitution and the debates of the Framers.   
One possibility is that the Framers knew what a “court” was and also what 
the “judicial power” was without any need for particular discussion or clarification.  
Thus, whatever they had in mind at that time is what controls and the best 
description of a “court” utilizing the “judicial power” in 1787 would have included 
some inherent authority.47 
The more plausible explanation, however, is that the Framers did not spend 
much time on the nature or structure of the federal courts because they fully 
expected Congress to handle it.  This explanation best fits the historical and textual 
materials.  If there is a single notable feature of the debates over Article III it is how 
little time was spent thinking about the nuts and bolts of court procedure or 
structure and how clearly Congress was left with the authority to answer these 
questions.  Perhaps the best example was the decision to leave it fully within 
                                                        
46
  Martin, supra note __, at 180; see also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over 
Criminal Procedure in Criminal Contempts in ‘Inferior’ Federal Courts – A Study in Separation of 
Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1017-18 (noting that “the Constitution has prescribed very little in 
determining the content, and guiding the exercise, of judicial power”); Pushaw, supra note __, at 822 (“The 
Constitution’s text neither authorizes nor forbids inherent judicial authority.  Moreover, the Convention 
delegates did not specifically discuss this issue.  Similarly, the Ratification records do not mention inherent 
power.”); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial 
Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 765-67 (1997) (“It is common ground that at the Constitutional 
Convention, the Framers did not address the issue of whether the judicial power granted to the federal 
courts includes the power to establish court practices and procedures.”). 
47
  See Anclien, supra note __, at 53-59. 
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Congress’ power to choose whether or not to create a federal judiciary outside of the 
Supreme Court at all. 
 The constitutional convention of 1787 was called to remedy perceived 
defects in the Articles of Confederation.  Among these defects was the lack of a 
unified federal judiciary.48  The Articles of Confederation provided for courts of very 
limited jurisdiction and did not guarantee judicial salary or longevity.49  The 
legislature, not the courts, had final appellate authority in all of these cases,50 so 
what federal judiciary existed was weak and subject to plenary legislative control, 
even in the core judicial area of deciding cases. 
 It was against this backdrop that the Framers of the Constitution considered 
the creation of an independent federal judiciary.  All of the preliminary plans for the 
structure of the new government included a national judiciary, to be created by 
Congress, consisting of a supreme tribunal and one or more inferior tribunals.51  
None of these proposals included substantial details as to the size, nature, or 
procedures of these potential courts.  These details were to be worked out by 
Congress when it created these various courts.52 
 The fact that none of the various drafts of the Constitution included any 
particular attention to procedure or inherent powers, but all empowered Congress 
to create and design the new judiciary, alone suggests an answer to the question of 
inherent authority.  From the outset, Congress was to be the creator and designer of 
                                                        
48
  See JOHN FERLING, A LEAP IN THE DARK: THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 275 
(2003). 
49
  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX.  
50
  Id. 
51
  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21-22, 95, 104-05 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(hereinafter FARRAND). 
52
  Id. 
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the federal judiciary.  The development of the eventual, final language of Article III 
supports this reading even more clearly.  
  1.  Optional Inferior Courts 
One of the first disagreements over the federal judiciary occurred in the 
Committee of the Whole.  The delegates disagreed over whether inferior federal 
courts were necessary at all.  James Madison’s notes from June 5, 1787 include the 
following: 
Mr. Rutlidge having obtained a rule for reconsideration of the clause for 
establishing inferior tribunals under the national authority, now moved that 
that part of the clause . . . should be expunged: arguing that the State 
Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance 
the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure 
the national rights & uniformity of Judgments: that it was making an 
unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction (of the States,) and creating 
unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system.53 
 
Madison responded that eliminating the requirement for inferior federal tribunals 
would have a number of logistical problems, including appeals “multiplied to a most 
oppressive degree” and the difficulty of remedying “improper” or “biased” state 
verdicts with new trials at the Supreme Court.54  He argued that an “effective 
judiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority was essential” 
and that a “Government without a proper Executive and Judiciary would be the 
mere trunk of a body without arms or legs to act or move.”55 
Nevertheless, the motion to strike out the reference to inferior tribunals 
carried by a very close vote.56  Madison then sought a compromise.  During the 
                                                        
53
  Id. at 124. 
54
  Id. 
55
  Id. 
56
  The vote was 5 for the motion, 4 against and 2 state delegations divided.  Id. at 125. 
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earlier debate John Dickinson had “contended strongly that if there was to be a 
National Legislature, there ought to be a national Judiciary, and that the former 
ought to have authority to institute the latter.”57  Madison suggested that the 
stricken inferior tribunals clause could be replaced with a motion that “the National 
Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.”58  In support of this 
compromise Madison and his supporters argued that “there was a distinction 
between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the 
Legislature to establish or not establish them.”59  This change was accepted by a 
wide margin.60 
The debate over inferior federal tribunals arose again on July 18, 1787 while 
the delegates met as a whole.  Opponents of inferior federal courts argued that the 
state courts could handle these cases in the first instance and that inferior federal 
courts would “create jealousies” with state courts.61  Proponents argued that “the 
Courts of the States can not be trusted with the administration of the National laws” 
and that inferior federal courts were necessary to ensure uniformity.62  Despite the 
debate, Madison’s notes show that the resolution allowing the national legislature to 
                                                        
57
  Id. 
58
  Id. at 118.  Yates’ journal for June 5th states the same.  Id. at 127.  Madison’s journal substitutes 
“institute” for “appoint,” id. at 125, but the other records, including Madison’s own journal notes from June 
13th use “appoint.”  Id. at 237.  For more details, see James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court 
Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191, 209 & 
n. 71 (2007). 
59
  1 FARRAND, supra note __, at 125. 
60
  Id. 
61
  2 Id. at 45-46. 
62
  2 Id. at 46. 
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appoint (or not appoint) inferior tribunals passed “nemine contradicente,” or 
unanimously.63  
2.  From “Appoint” to “Establish,” to “Constitute,” and Finally to 
“Ordain and Establish”   
 
Later word changes to Article III further support this reading.  The language 
allowing the creation of inferior federal courts first changed from “appoint,” to 
“establish,” and then to “constitute,” and finally to “ordain and establish.”  Each of 
these word changes suggests increased congressional power.  The first few 
iterations of the Madisonian compromise stated that the “national legislature be 
empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.”64  When the drafting was moved to the 
Committee of Detail most of the early documents again use the word “appoint,” 
although the word “establish” appears for the first time.65 
By the time the draft Constitution left the Committee of Detail, however, 
“appoint” had been replaced by “constitute” and the language begins to closely 
resemble the final draft: “The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in 
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as shall, from time to time, be 
constituted by the legislature of the United States.”66  The addition of “time to time” 
and the change to “constitute” suggests a more robust congressional role in creating 
and managing the inferior courts.  
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  Id.  Madison’s notes actually use the contraction, “nem. con.”  For a definition of nem. con., see infra 
note __ and accompanying text. 
64
  1 FARRAND, supra note __, at 118, 127, 237; 2 Id. 38-39,  
65
  2 Id. at 133, 144 (“appoint); 2 Id. at 146 (“appoint” scratched out and replaced by “establish”). 
66
  2 Id. at 172. 
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The Committee on Style later settled on the final text of Article III by 
changing “constitute” to “ordain and establish.”67  Article I’s grant of legislative 
power remained “constitute:” Article I, Section 8 states that Congress has the power 
to “constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”68 
The change from “appoint” to another verb is quite telling.  “Appoint” does 
not suggest much power over formation or design, whereas “establish,” “constitute,” 
or “ordain” all suggest a much broader power.  This is especially so because the 
word “appoint” may have suggested a congressional power to “appoint” state courts 
to hear federal matters, as had been common under the Articles of Confederation.69  
The Articles of Confederation used the term “appoint” for “courts for the trial of 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas” and the term “establish” for 
“courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures.”70  
Consistent with these different terms, the Continental Congress “appointed” 
state courts to hear the trial of piracy and felonies on the high seas71 and 
“established”/designed a new court of appeals for cases of capture from scratch.72  
Thus, the Framers may well have understood the power to “appoint” as quite 
narrow and may not have suggested any independent lower federal judiciary at all.  
Thus, the replacement of “appoint” with “constitute” or “establish” describes a 
                                                        
67
  Compare 2 Id. at 186 (using “constitute”) with 2 Id. at 600 (“ordain and establish”). 
68
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). 
69
  See GOEBEL, supra note __, at 212. 
70
  See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX  (Congress has power of “appointing courts for the 
trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and 
determining finally appeals in all cases of captures”). 
71
  GOEBEL, supra note __, at 173. 
72
  Id. at 167-78. 
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significant change in congressional authority and the nature of the potential inferior 
federal courts. 
There is no discussion of the change in the text from “constitute” to “ordain 
and establish,” but that change likewise signals significant congressional power over 
the inferior courts.  The use of two words instead of one and the use of “ordain” in 
conjunction with “establish” are quite telling.  At the time of the Constitutional 
Convention one of the meanings of “constitute” was to establish an institution.73  
Thus, in 1787 establish and constitute had similar meanings when it came to 
institutions.   
“Ordain,” however, suggests a much broader power and purpose.  Four 
contemporary state constitutions used “ordain” in conjunction with the creation of 
the state constitution or the state itself, often with explicitly religious language.74  In 
describing the meaning of the change from “constitute” to “ordain and establish,” 
Julius Goebel has called the latter phrase “words of fiat.”75   
There are four likely implications of this word change.  First, the Committee 
on Style presumably changed one word to two in an effort to expand upon what the 
Constitution means when it describes the potential creation of inferior federal 
courts.  Second, these two words were meant to express something different than 
“constitute” alone would have (or does in Article I).  Third, “ordain,” suggests an 
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  1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 488 (Oxford University Press 1993).  The OED 
dates the origination of this meaning of “constitute” to the mid-sixteenth century and later. 
74
  See Ma. Const. preamble (1780) (“devoutly imploring His direction in so interesting a design, do agree 
upon, ordain and establish the following Declaration of Rights, and Frame of Government, as the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts”); Pa. Const. preamble (recognizing the “Author of 
existence” and acting to “ordain, declare, and establish, the following Declaration of Rights and Frame of 
Government, to be the CONSTITUTION of this commonwealth”); Va. Const. preamble (1776) (“ordain 
and declare”); N.Y. Const. art. I & II (1777) (“ordain, determine, and declare”). 
75
  GOEBEL, supra note __, at 247. 
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additional, weightier power.  In light of its contemporary use in various state 
constitutions and its religious overtones, “ordain” implies that Congress has a far-
reaching design power.76  Last, the change of wording in Article III, but not in Article 
I, may suggest a desire to especially emphasize Congress’ power, by stating a 
broader version of it in Article III than appears in Article I. 
3. The Debate Over the Exceptions Clause 
Some commentators have reached an opposite conclusion based upon the 
debate over the exceptions clause.77  On August 27, 1787 the delegates made several 
changes affecting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts.78  During these edits there was a motion to amend the exceptions clause so 
that the sentence – “In all the other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate 
both as to law and fact with such exceptions and under such regulations as the 
legislature shall make” – be amended to read “In all the other cases before 
                                                        
76
  Note that Julius Goebel has argued that the use of the words “ordain and establish” meant that the 
creation of inferior federal courts was actually mandatory.  See Id. at 246-47.  This argument ignores the 
clearly applicable conditional “may” earlier in the sentence and is thus untenable. 
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  The exceptions clause follows the brief list of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction and states: “In 
all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and 
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to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1006 (2007) (same) with William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical 
Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 268 (1973) (describing Congress’ power to make 
jurisdictional exceptions “as plenary as the power to regulate commerce”); Martin H. Redish, 
Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to 
Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 113, 149 (1982) (arguing that the exceptions power is “clear”); Herbert 
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1004-5 (1965) (same). 
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  2 FARRAND, supra note __ at 421-32. 
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mentioned the judicial power shall be exercised in such manner as the legislature 
shall direct.”79  This motion was defeated by a 6-2 vote.80   
Robert Clinton has pointed to this motion and argued that a “clearer rejection 
of congressional authority over judicial powers is hard to imagine.”81  Joseph 
Anclien has utilized this rejection as support for strong constitutional inherent 
powers.82   
There are several reasons not to read the rejection of the words “the judicial 
power shall be exercised in such manner as the legislature shall direct” as a 
statement against congressional power over judicial inherent powers.  The motion 
was made in the context of questions of jurisdiction, not court process or inherent 
powers.83   
Further, there is no description of the debate over this amendment or why it 
was proposed and failed.  It may have failed because it did not, in fact, change or add 
anything to the congressional power already expressed in the Exceptions Clause, 
which was facially quite broad in draft form – it allowed “such exceptions and [] 
such regulations as the legislature shall make.”   
Last, the proposed language may actually have expanded congressional 
control from jurisdiction to the actual decision-making authority of courts, and 
while the Framers were seemingly unconcerned about court procedure, they were 
quite concerned about legislative interference with the actual process of deciding 
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  2 Id. at 425, 431. 
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  Id. 
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  Clinton, supra note __, at 791; see also Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 173 (1960). 
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  Anclien, supra note __, at 55 n. 95. 
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  See Alex Glashausser, A Return to Form for the Exceptions Clause, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1383, 1431-35 
(2010) (describing context of the comment). 
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cases.84  The vote could have simply been against allowing Congress the power to 
interfere with core decision-making, not a rejection of congressional control of the 
Supreme Court’s non-original jurisdiction, let alone any power over procedure or 
contempt.  Thus, it is a stretch to take this one vote on jurisdiction, under ambiguous 
circumstances with no recorded debate, as support for a strong theory of inherent 
judicial authority.  
4.  The Framers’ Indifference to the Details of the Federal Judiciary 
Beyond the words of the Constitution and the records of the debate, the lack 
of explicit discussion of the nature and shape of the courts is worth noting.  The 
Framers spent comparatively little time discussing or debating the judiciary,85 and 
the Constitution itself describes the executive and the legislative branches with 
much greater detail and clarity.  Further, the fact that the bulk of the discussion over 
inferior federal courts consisted of whether any inferior federal courts were 
necessary at all hardly suggests concern amongst the Framers about any inherent 
powers of the judiciary.   
The Framers’ debate and adoption of the various Article III guarantees of life 
tenure and salary likewise supports a negative inference from the Framers’ silence 
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  See Julian Velasco, Congressional Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the 
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the convention.”). 
 26
on inherent authority.86  When an issue of court structure mattered, like the salary 
and tenure guarantees for federal judges, there was extensive debate and an explicit 
guarantee in Article III.  
Moreover, it should not have been inconceivable to the Framers that leaving 
the design of the courts to Congress might result in unfamiliar procedures and court 
structures.  To the contrary, when the Continental Congress designed a court of 
appeals under the Articles of Confederacy it declined to grant that court the powers 
of contempt.87  Nor did the court have the power to enforce its own judgments.88  
This recent experience should certainly have raised the salience of the inherent 
powers of courts and if the Framers deemed these powers indispensible they would 
have likely included them in Article III. 
C.   The Ratification Debates 
While the constitutional convention spent comparatively limited time on the 
judiciary, the state ratification debates focused quite squarely Article III.  The 
Antifederalists argued that ratifying the Constitution would impinge upon the civil 
right to a jury trial89 and that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court granted it 
unbridled power.90  Contemporary records from the ratification debates and the 
Federalist Papers (written in support of ratification) make clear that the primary 
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  For a brief description of these debates, see Thomas I. Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility 
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87
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answer to each of these concerns was Congress’ tremendous power over the 
courts.91   
1.  The Federalist Papers 
The most famous of these defenses is Alexander Hamilton’s “least dangerous 
branch” argument from Federalist 78: 
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must 
perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, 
the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least 
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in 
a capacity to annoy or injure them.  The Executive not only dispenses the 
honors, but holds the sword of the community.  The legislature not only 
commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights 
of every citizen are to be regulated.  The judiciary, on the contrary, has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the 
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution 
whatever.  It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely 
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm 
even for the efficacy of its judgments.92  
 
Madison thus strongly suggests that the constitutional silence on inherent powers 
meant that Congress “not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by 
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.” 
There are multiple other examples.  Federalist No. 83 argues that the 
Constitution’s silence on civil jury trials does not mean that civil jury trials were 
barred.  Instead, that question is explicitly left to Congress: “A power to constitute 
courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial; and consequently, if nothing was 
said in the Constitution on the subject of juries, the legislature would be at liberty 
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either to adopt that institution or to let it alone.”93  In Federalist No. 80, Alexander 
Hamilton attempted to assuage worries over federal court power by noting that if 
there were “partial inconveniences” with the judiciary “it ought to be recalled that 
the national legislature will have ample authority to make such exceptions and to 
prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove these 
inconveniences.”94  
2.  State Ratification Conventions 
The records from the state ratification conventions also reflect this 
understanding of Congress’ Article I power.  Both critics and supporters of the new 
Constitution recognized Article I’s reach and plainly stated that Congress (for good 
or for ill) would have plenary power over the shape and nature of a possible new 
federal judiciary.  In arguing against ratification in Massachusetts, Abraham Holmes 
noted that although the right to a jury in a criminal trial was guaranteed, this 
protection was circumscribed by Congress’ Article I power over criminal procedure: 
“But what makes the matter still more alarming is, that the mode of criminal process 
is to be pointed out by Congress, and they have no constitutional check on them.”95   
In arguing against the breadth of federal jurisdiction during the Virginia 
ratification debates George Mason asked: “What is there left to the state courts?  
Will any gentleman be pleased, candidly, fairly, and without sophistry, to show us 
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what remains?  There is no limitation. . . .  The inferior courts are to be as numerous 
as Congress may think proper.  They are to be of whatever nature they please.”96   
In defense, the Constitution’s supporters repeatedly turned to Congress’ 
power over the judiciary.  Supporters promised that Congress would guarantee civil 
jury trials.  James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional Convention’s Committee of 
Detail, noted that the jury and court procedures were quite different from state to 
state and that the constitutional convention could not have gone “into a particular 
detail of the manner that would have suited each state.”  Better to give Congress “the 
power of making regulations with respect to the mode of trial” and leave the courts 
“to be particularly organized by the legislature – the representatives of the United 
States – from time to time, as should be most eligible and proper.”97  In a speech in 
Philadelphia, Wilson again expressed confidence over the civil jury, arguing “that no 
danger could possibly ensue, since the proceedings of the supreme court are to be 
regulated by the congress, which is a faithful representation of the people.”98 
  In North Carolina James Iredell stated a similar explanation for 
constitutional silence on civil juries: “It is impossible to make every (judicial) 
regulation at once.  Congress, who are our own representatives, will undoubtedly 
make such regulations as will suit the convenience and secure the liberty of the 
people.”99   
                                                        
96
  3 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note __ at 521. 
97
  2 Id. at 488.   
98
  3 FARRAND, supra note __, at 101.  
99
  4 Id. at 152.  See also id. at 145 (Iredell stating that “It is not to be presumed that the Congress would 
dare to deprive the people of this valuable privilege.”); id. at 151 (Archibold McClaine of North Carolina 
addressing the civil jury trial and noting that “It is impossible to lay down any constitutional rule for the 
government of all the different states in each particular.  But it will be easy for the legislature to make laws 
to accommodate the people in every part of the Union, as circumstances may arise.”). 
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James Madison argued that the federal judiciary would be “safe and 
convenient for the states and the people at large” because of the “power given to the 
general legislature to establish such courts as may be judged necessary and 
expedient.”100  The concern over the destruction of the civil jury trial was 
overblown, because “it is in the power of Congress to prevent it, or prescribe such a 
mode as will secure the privilege of jury trial.”101  In arguing for the Constitution, 
Judge Edmund Pendleton, president of the Virginia ratifying convention, noted 
Congress’ freedom to design and redesign the federal judiciary and the wisdom of 
leaving the details of the judiciary to Congress, who “may find reasons to change and 
vary them as experience shall dictate.”102   
D.   The Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789 
The earliest congressional acts establishing the federal judiciary further 
support this understanding.  Following adoption of the new Constitution, Congress 
passed three laws constituting the new federal judiciary and setting some of the 
procedures for their operation, while leaving others to the discretion of the courts.  
The Judiciary Act of 1789,103 The Federal Process Act of 1789,104 and the Crimes Act 
                                                        
100
  3 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note __, at 534. 
101
  Id.  See also id. at 558, 560-61 (John Marshall of Virginia stating that Congress will “not give a trial by 
jury where it is not necessary, but . . . wherever it is thought expedient”); id. at 572-73 (Edmund Randolph 
of Virginia stating no worry over the potential for the Supreme Court to reverse findings of fact, because 
“Congress can regulate it properly, and I have no doubt they will”).  Patrick Henry likewise expressed 
confidence that Congress would decide the fate of the civil jury trial.  Id. at 544-45, 577-78.  There are a 
few additional examples listed in William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time 
Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 768-69 (1997). 
102
  3 Id. at 517. 
103
  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
104
  Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93. 
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of 1790105 basically established the nature, structure, and jurisdiction of the new 
federal judiciary.106  
These various Acts are powerful evidence of the Framers’ understanding of 
Articles I and III.107  A Senate subcommittee consisting of three former delegates to 
the constitutional convention – Oliver Ellsworth, William Paterson and Caleb Strong 
– drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789.108  Ellsworth was a particularly influential 
delegate and served on the first Committee of Detail; he was also the principal 
drafter of the Judiciary Act.109  The Supreme Court has noted that the Judiciary Act of 
1789 was “passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of 
whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, and is contemporaneous 
and weighty evidence of its true meaning.”110  
 An examination of these foundational laws strongly suggests that the first 
Congress thought it had plenary power under Article I over any issues of inherent 
power, as it addressed procedure and jurisdiction in a manner inconsistent with any 
superior judicial power in this area.  Congress took several different approaches in 
these Acts.  In some cases it granted the new federal courts broad discretion in how 
                                                        
105
  The Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112. 
106
  Congress passed amendments to the Process Act in 1792, see Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275, 
and the Judiciary Act in 1793.  Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 333. 
107
  See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 28 (4th ed. 1996) (“[T]he first Judiciary Act is widely viewed as an indicator of the original 
understanding of Article III and, in particular, of Congress' constitutional obligations concerning the 
vesting of federal jurisdiction.”). 
108
  Holt, supra note __, at 1478-79. 
109
  See Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. 
REV. 609, 637 (2003); James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There's a Remedy, There's a 
Right: A Skeptic's Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 274-75 (2004).  For an excellent 
discussion of Ellsworth’s role, see Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power to Regulate the federal Judiciary: What 
the First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. 
REV. 847, 884-87 (2010). 
110
  Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, ET AL., HART & 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 28 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that “the first 
Judiciary Act is widely viewed as an indicator of the original understanding of Article III”). 
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to structure procedure.  In others it explicitly instructed courts to follow the 
practices at the time.  Lastly some sections were quite specific and innovative.  
Between these three approaches there can be little doubt that Congress thought it 
had full authority to design and alter federal court processes and procedures.  
The 1789 Judiciary Act is the longest and most comprehensive of the initial 
Acts.111  In many areas the Judiciary Act explicitly left federal courts to their own 
discretion.  Section 17 described three areas of discretion: 
That all the said courts of the United States shall have power to grant new 
trials, in cases where there has been a trial by jury for reasons for which new 
trials have usually been granted in the courts of law; (a) and shall have 
power to impose and administer all necessary oaths or affirmations, and to 
punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all 
contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same; (b) and to 
make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business of 
said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United 
States.112  
 
These three grants are contiguous in a single section of the Act and each grants 
discretion in a different manner: new trials are governed by current practice, 
contempt is explicitly discretionary, and the creation of necessary rules is allowed, 
as long as they do not violate the laws of the United States.113 
While Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 left broad discretion to courts, 
multiple other sections offered many more specifics, including various procedural 
rules that were alterations to the current practices.  David Engdahl points out three 
                                                        
111
  Wythe Holt’s history of the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 offers a tremendous overview of the 
Act’s features, Holt, supra note __, at 1485-90, as well as a detailed and most interesting history of its 
passage.  Id. at 1478-85. 
112
  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83. 
113
  Although the last clause of Section 17 seems to grant Federal Courts broad rule-making authority, it is 
worth noting that the Process Act of 1789 was passed just five days later and basically instructed that in 
cases at law, Federal courts were to follow the procedures of the state where they were located.  See 
Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94.  Realistically, this meant that court discretion in cases at 
law was considerably curtailed despite the broad language. 
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such innovations:114 allowing litigants in actions at law to utilize the discovery 
techniques available in equity actions,115 allowing for depositions de bene esse,116 
and allowing for the possibility of jury assessment of damages in certain default or 
demurrer cases.117   
The Process Act of 1789 covered the procedures in equity, admiralty and 
maritime, which were to “be according to the course of civil law,”118 i.e. they were to 
follow the contemporary court procedures.  The Process Act again slightly changed 
the traditional procedure by allowing a plaintiff to take out a capias ad 
satisfaciendum in the first instance.119 
Thus, the Judiciary and Process Acts make clear that the first Congress 
considered its Article I power over court process and procedure to be plenary.  The 
combination of changes to some current procedures, explicit ratification of other 
current procedures, with the grant of almost unfettered discretion in other areas 
well establishes Congress’ broad vision of its own power.  The combination also 
makes it virtually impossible that the first Congress considered there to be a core 
judicial inherent power that outweighed Congress’ own power. 
                                                        
114
  Engdahl, supra note __, at 86. 
115
  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. 73, 82. 
116
  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88-89.  Depositions de bene esse were a procedure for 
the taking of depositions in alternative court forums for witnesses residing more than 100 miles from the 
home courthouse.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88-89.   
117
  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 26, 1 Stat. 73, 87. 
118
  Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94. 
119
  Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94.  The first draft version of the Process Act actually 
included many more procedural specifics, including the manner and time of filing and answering in civil 
suits, the form of summonses and service, defaults and executions.  See Ryan, supra note __, at 771-72; 
WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 51 (1995).  A “capias ad 
satisfaciendum” was a writ of execution that allowed the Sherriff to take custody of a judgment debtor 
pending a court date.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 208 (6th ed. 1990). 
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Congress’ expansive vision of its power over the federal courts remained for 
a significant period following 1789.  For example, in 1801 and 1802 there was a 
“judiciary crisis,” where a lame duck Federalist Congress passed one judiciary act in 
1801, only to see that act repealed the next year by a new Republican Congress.120  
As part of this crisis Congress dispossessed a number of federal judgeships, changed 
the structure of the federal judiciary, and postponed Supreme Court review of these 
moves by changing the next date the Court would convene.121  The congressional 
debates explicitly mentioned the possibility that the Supreme Court would overturn 
the law, but the Court never reached that question.122    
In Stuart v. Laird,123 the Court did hold that Congress could transfer a case 
from one court to anther after eliminating the original court: “Congress have 
constitutional authority to establish from time to time such inferior tribunals as they 
may think proper; and to transfer a cause from one such tribunal to another. In this 
last particular, there are no words in the constitution to prohibit or restrain the 
                                                        
120
  See Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 
1426 (2006); Jed H. Shugerman, Marbury and Judicial Deference: The Shadow of Whittington v. Polk and 
the Maryland Judiciary Battle, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 58, 89-84 (2002).  
121
  See Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall, The Mandamus Case, and the Judiciary Crisis, 1801-1803, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 291-99 (2003); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES 
HISTORY 222-24 (1926).  As part of this debate Senator Stevens Mason of Virginia well stated the 
continuing understanding that the inferior tribunals clause granted Congress plenary authority in the 
establishment, design and redesign of the lower federal courts: “are we not equally justified in considering 
their establishment as dependent upon the legislature, who may, from time to time, ordain them, as the 
public good requires? Can any other meaning be applied to the words ‘from time to time?’ And nothing can 
be more important on this subject than that the legislature should have power, from time to time, to create, 
to annul, or to modify, the courts, as the public good may require--not merely to-day, but forever, and 
whenever a change of circumstances may suggest the propriety of a different organization.”  4 ELLIOTT, 
DEBATES, supra note __, at 443. 
122
  See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch, 1801-1805, 33 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219, 234 (1998); Charles Gardner Geyh, The Origins and History of Federal 
Judicial Independence, in A.B.A. COMM'N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN 
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY app. A at 67, 82 (1997). 
123
  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
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exercise of legislative power.”124  Thus, Congress’ actions (and the Court’s tacit 
acquiescence) certainly evince a congressional understanding of near plenary 
Article I power over the federal judiciary.125 
 E.  Early Case Law 
Other early federal cases follow the original understanding of a near plenary 
Article I power.  For example, in Wayman v. Southard126 the Defendant argued that 
Congress lacked the authority to regulate the execution of federal court judgments 
by U.S. Marshals.127  Chief Justice Marshall made quick work of this argument and 
stated Congress’ plenary power over the federal judiciary under Articles I’s 
necessary and proper clause: 
The constitution concludes its enumeration of granted powers, with a clause 
authorizing Congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested 
by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any 
department or officer thereof. The judicial department is invested with 
jurisdiction in certain specified cases, in all which it has power to render 
judgment. 
 
That a power to make laws for carrying into execution all the judgments 
which the judicial department has power to pronounce, is expressly 
conferred by this clause, seems to be one of those plain propositions which 
reasoning cannot render plainer. The terms of the clause, neither require nor 
admit of elucidation. The Court, therefore, will only say, that no doubt 
whatever is entertained on the power of Congress over the subject. The only 
inquiry is, how far has this power been exercised?128 
 
                                                        
124
  Id. at 309. 
125
  Frankfurter and Landis offer further support in a classic 1924 article noting congressional power over 
criminal contempt, where they collect a lengthy list of congressional Acts controlling the practice and 
procedures of the federal courts.  Frankfurter and Landis refer to this list as “the authentic, if not succulent, 
testimony of the Acts of Congress.”  Frankfurter & Landis, supra note __, at 1018-1020. 
126
  23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). 
127
  Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) at 2. 
128
  Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) at 22. 
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In a later section of the opinion Marshall notes that Congress may delegate some of 
this power to the judiciary and specifically notes Section 17 of the Judiciary Act as 
such a permissible delegation.129   
 In a companion case from the same term, the Court again faced an issue of 
marshals executing a judgment in Bank of the United States v. Halstead.130  In 
Halstead the Court reaffirms Congress’ plenary Article I power over court process: 
It cannot certainly be contended, with the least colour of plausibility, that 
Congress does not possess the uncontrolled power to legislate with respect 
both to the form and effect of executions issued upon judgments recovered in 
the Courts of the United States. . . .  The authority to carry into complete effect 
the judgments of the Courts, necessarily results, by implication, from the 
power to ordain and establish such Courts.  But it does not rest altogether 
upon such implication; for express authority is given to Congress to make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the 
powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or 
in any department or officer thereof.131 
 
Later in the same case the Court addressed whether the Process Act of 1792’s 
instruction that federal courts were to follow state court procedures for “the forms 
of writs, executions and other process”132 was an impermissible delegation of the 
legislative power.133  Notably, the Court did not reject the characterization of the 
power to control process as legislative.  On the contrary, the Court explicitly stated 
“Congress might regulate the whole practice of the Courts, if it was deemed 
expedient so to do.”134  Instead, Congress “vested [the power of execution] in the 
Courts.”135 
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  Id. at 43. 
130
  23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 51 (1825). 
131
  Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) at 53-54. 
132
  Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275-76. 
133
  Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) at 61-62. 
134
  Id. at 61. 
135
  Id. 
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 The Court reiterated this holding and reasoning in Livingston v. Story136 and 
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts.137  All of these cases are quite clear that Congress has 
plenary Article I authority over court procedures because of the power to establish 
the judiciary and pass laws necessary and proper to its operation.  Earlier cases 
from the inferior federal courts are similar.138  Joseph Story’s well known 
                                                        
136
  34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835).  In Livingston the defendant challenged the use of equity jurisdiction in the 
newly created federal courts in the new state of Louisiana.  Justice Thompson declared:  
 
That congress has the power to establish circuit and district courts in any and all the states, and 
confer on them equitable jurisdiction in cases coming within the constitution, cannot admit of a 
doubt. It falls within the express words of the constitution. ‘The judicial power of the United 
States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may, from 
time to time, ordain and establish.’ Article 3. And that the power to ordain and establish, carries 
with it the power to prescribe and regulate the modes of proceeding in such courts, admits of as 
little doubt. 
 
Id. at 656. 
137
  37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).  There was a question whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over a 
dispute between two states.  In recognizing the constitutionality of their jurisdiction the Court again 
addressed congressional power in this regard: 
 
It was necessarily left to the legislative power to organize the Supreme Court, to define its powers 
consistently with the constitution, as to its original jurisdiction; and to distribute the residue of the 
judicial power between this and the inferior courts, which it was bound to ordain and establish, 
defining their respective powers, whether original or appellate, by which and how it should be 
exercised. In obedience to the injunction of the constitution, congress exercised their power, so far 
as they thought it necessary and proper, under the seventeenth clause of the eighth section, first 
article, for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the judicial, as well as 
all other departments and officers of the government of the United States.  No department could 
organize itself; the constitution provided for the organization of the legislative power, and the 
mode of its exercise, but it delineated only the great outlines of the judicial power; leaving the 
details to congress, in whom was vested, by express delegation, the power to pass all laws 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers except their own. The distribution and 
appropriate exercise of the judicial power, must therefore be made by laws passed by congress. 
 
Id. at 721. 
138
  For some further examples from lower federal courts, consider Livingston v. Van Ingen, 
1 Paine 45, 15 F. Cas. 697, 698 (C.C.N.Y. 1811) (“It is as certain, that they are indebted to congress, under 
the constitution, for their creation, and that instead of extending their powers as the exigencies of suitors 
may require, or may by themselves be thought reasonable, they have hitherto been regarded as dependent 
on that body for all the powers they possess.”); Ex parte Cabrera, 4 F. Cas. 964, 965 (C.C.Pa. 1805) 
(“[T]he residuum of the judicial power is vested in such inferior courts, as congress may, from time to time, 
ordain and establish. Now, if follows, that when congress has established such inferior courts, it lies with 
that body, to parcel out the judicial powers amongst them, in such manner, as may seem to them most 
proper.”); The Little Ann, 15 F.Cas. 622, 623 (C.C.N.Y. 1810) (“In ascertaining what portion of the general 
powers delegated by the constitution of the United States to the federal judiciary, is to be exercised by any 
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Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States likewise supports plenary 
Article I control.139 
 Nevertheless, proponents of a constitutional inherent authority maintain 
judicial superiority over Congress for any court procedure that is necessary to the 
operation of the courts.  They point to dicta in two early Supreme Court cases.  
 In Ex Parte Bollman,140 the Court held that it lacked common law power to 
issue a writ of habeas corpus, and that any ability to do so must be explicitly granted 
by Congress.141   Immediately following that holding, the Court added in dicta “This 
opinion is not to be considered as abridging the power of courts over their own 
officers, or to protect themselves, and their members, from being disturbed in the 
exercise of their functions.  It extends only to the power of taking cognizance of any 
question between individuals, or between the government and individuals.”142  
 In United States v. Hudson,143 the Court rejected common law crimes.  
Because the Constitution created a federal government of enumerated powers, 
“[t]he legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a 
punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence” in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
one of the inferior courts, recourse must be had to the laws creating the tribunal, and designating its 
jurisdiction.”). 
139
  3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1752 (Boston, 
Hilliard, Gray & Company 1833) (“[I]n all cases where the judicial power of the United States is to be 
exercised, it is for Congress alone to furnish the rules of proceeding, to direct the process, to declare the 
nature and effect of the process, and the mode in which the judgments consequent thereon shall be 
executed.”). 
140
  8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
141
  Id. at 93-94. 
142
  Id. at 94. 
143
  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
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order for a federal court to act.144  Nevertheless, similar to Bollman, the Court 
followed up this recognition of congressional power with a caveat in dicta:  
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from 
the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state is 
not among those powers. To fine for contempt – imprison for contumacy –
inforce the observance of order, &c. are powers which cannot be dispensed 
with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others: and 
so far our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from 
statute.145 
 
The easiest, but least satisfying, answer to these quotes is to simply deride them as 
dicta.  Given that roughly contemporary and later Supreme Courts upheld 
substantial congressional control over the courts146 – and that contemporary lower 
courts held the opposite147 – that may actually be a fair reading of these cases. 
 There is an alternate reading of these cases, however.  The holdings and 
reasoning in Bollman and Hudson – that the Constitution’s grant of law making 
power to Congress eliminates any common law crimes – actually support plenary 
congressional Article I power and it is possible to read these dicta as protecting the 
Courts ability to act in the absence of congressional authorization, not necessarily in 
contradiction of congressional action.   
Bollman and Hudson are congressional silence cases: in both cases the Court 
was being asked to act in an area where Congress had not spoken.  In both cases the 
Court refused this invitation, requiring an explicit grant of power.  By analogy, the 
Court’s dicta could be asserting a power to continue to act in the absence of 
                                                        
144
  Id. at 34. 
145
  Id. 
146
  See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
147
  See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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congressional authority, not necessarily in opposition to congressional authority.148  
Bollman makes no claim to any strong constitutional inherent power at all; it simply 
states that courts retain power over decorum and their officers even without 
explicit congressional approval.  Likewise, Hudson does not necessarily claim a 
power superior to Congress.  Instead, it claims a power “not immediately derived 
from statute.”149 
 Anderson v. Dunn,150 upheld a non-statutory contempt power for Congress 
and supports this reading of Bollman and Hudson.  The Court began by deriving 
Congress’ contempt power by “implication.”151  The Court then analogized this 
power to the implied judicial power over contempt:  
It is true, that the Courts of justice of the United States are vested, by express 
statute provision, with power to fine and imprison for contempts; but it does 
not follow, from this circumstance, that they would not have exercised that 
power without the aid of the statute, or not, in cases, if such should occur, to 
which such statute provision may not extend.152   
 
In short, Anderson notes that federal courts would have had a non-statutory claim to 
a contempt power if Congress had not acted.  Nevertheless, there is nothing in 
Anderson to suggest that the implied contempt power is not subject to congressional 
control or even elimination. 
Thus, the history, text, ratification, and aftermath of the Constitution do not 
support a strong constitutional inherent authority.  While it was likely understood 
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  One difficulty with this reading is that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did expressly allow for contempt and 
enforcement of judgments, so this statement may imply a power beyond that already granted by Congress.  
Again, that does not necessarily mean that Bollman or Hudson claimed a judicial power superior to 
Congress in this area. 
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  Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34. 
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  19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204 (1821). 
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  Id. at 225-26. 
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  Id. at 227. 
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that Congress could not interfere with the core judicial power of deciding cases,153 it 
seems highly unlikely that these constitutional powers stretched to questions of 
court procedure, rules or structure. 
II. THE JUDICIARY’S INTERSTITIAL POWER  
 In light of Congress’ broad Article I powers, it is worth asking whether courts 
have any power to act without explicit congressional approval.  Both Robert Pushaw 
and William Van Alstyne have argued that they cannot.154 
 This argument ignores the nature of the “judicial power” and “courts” in the 
late-18th century, as well as Article III’s reference to “law and equity.”  While it is 
unlikely that the Framer’s use of these terms meant to place the judiciary in a 
superior position to Congress, it is also unlikely that the Framers meant to cripple 
the new judiciary by requiring Congress to approve each and every activity of these 
new courts.  
 A.   The Nature of Courts in 1787 
 From before the time of the framing until today, courts have always had 
interstitial authority to fill gaps left in congressional acts.155  In the late Eighteenth 
century, Anglo-American courts were particularly malleable and regularly 
addressed process and procedure on a case-by-case basis, bound by previous 
practice and the common law.156  There was certainly no contemporary Anglo-
American court that had had a set of legislatively or judicially created rules that 
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  See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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  See Van Alstyne, supra note __, at 128-29; Pushaw, supra note __, at 848-49. 
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  Barrett, supra note __, at 818-19. 
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  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal 
Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 473 (1994) (arguing that in England and America at the time of the 
framing “procedural rules underwent frequent adaptation”). 
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governed every step of court operations.  Courts in 1787 would have been at a loss 
without the power to act in the absence of legislative authority.  
A brief review of the nature of the courts in England and the colonies in the 
eighteenth century supports this view.  While the nature and extent of judicial 
power to reject legislative control was unclear in the colonies and England,157 the 
power of courts to act in the absence of legislative authority in matters of procedure 
or supervision was crystal clear.158  From the birth of common law courts up to the 
late nineteenth century, courts regularly acted on their own on various procedural 
matters.  “[T]he superior courts of common law have exercised [inherent] power . . . 
from the earliest times . . . .  [T]he exercise of such power developed along two paths, 
namely, by way of punishing contempt of court and of its process, and by way of 
regulating the practice of the court and preventing the abuse of process.”159 
 Robert Pushaw has noted four distinct categories of inherent power 
exercised by common law courts leading up to the time of the framing.  These courts 
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  Some contemporary sources suggest that after the Glorious Revolution parliament had plenary control 
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“Law of the Land.”  See Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WISC. L. REV. 941, 948-
73 (1990).  
158
  Consider the following from Daniel Meador: 
 
Long before the American Revolution, English courts assumed the authority to prevent abuses of 
their processes and procedures and to control the conduct of persons appearing before them or 
interfering with their business.   The courts' control over process often took the form of dismissals 
of actions for failure to prosecute or dismissals on grounds of frivolousness or vexatiousness.  
Courts asserted control over various kinds of disruptive conduct through contempt proceedings in 
which detention and fines could be imposed – sanctions deemed to be attributes of judicial power 
and thus requiring no specific authorization.  It has also long been recognized in England that a 
court has inherent authority to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure to govern the 
conduct of cases over which it has jurisdiction. 
 
Meador, supra note __, at 1805-6 (1995). 
159
  I.H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1970, at 23, 25. 
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acted on their own to create rules of adjective law, to control the administration and 
process of their internal business, to punish misconduct, and to exercise supervisory 
power over inferior courts.160  The colonial courts followed a similar path and even 
the post-revolution, pre-Constitution cases from 1776-1787 show that courts 
continued to independently make adjective law and impose sanctions for 
misconduct.161 
The words and actions of the Founders show that they likewise favored a 
flexible court system.  Madison noted “[m]uch detail ought to be avoided in the 
constitutional regulation of this department, that there may be room for changes 
which may be demanded by the progressive changes in the state of our 
population.”162  The addition of the words “from time to time” to the clause allowing 
Congress to create inferior tribunals, first reported on August 6, 1787 with no 
comment,163 likewise suggests flexibility.   
 The decision to include federal jurisdiction “both in law and equity”164 also 
belies the view that courts could only act following approval by Congress.  Equity 
jurisdiction itself was immensely flexible and unbound from legislative control as of 
1787.165  The addition of equity jurisdiction is thus fundamentally at odds with a 
requirement of congressional pre-approval on matters of procedure or process. 
                                                        
160
  Pushaw, supra note __ at 810-14. 
161
  Id. at 816-22.  For a general overview of the transplantation of the English common law to the colonial 
courts, see GOEBEL, supra note __ at 1-95. 
162
  James Madison, Observations on the “Draught of a Constitution for Virginia” (Oct. 15, 1788), in 2 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 290 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977).  This letter concerns 
the framing of the Virginia Constitution, but reflects Madison’s views at the time of the framing of the 
United States Constitution as well. 
163
  2 FARRAND, supra note __, at 186. 
164
  Added, over objections, on August 27, 1789 to Article III.  See 2 FARRAND, supra note __, at 428. 
165
  See PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE 47 (1990) (describing the flexible use of equity 
by American colonial courts); Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the 
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The Framers also spent time wrestling with the interaction between the 
common law and the new federal legislature and judiciary.166  The role of the 
common law as a source of criminal or civil law under the new Constitution was 
unclear, but its role in process and procedure was very likely status quo.  The 
Framers said very little about court structure or process because they expected 
courts to behave as they had for years.167  Thus, the Framers granted Congress the 
power to act as it saw fit, but their silence on the details also suggested a 
continuation of courts’ ability to fill legislative gaps when necessary. 
 Reflection on the nature of the courts of the time makes this result necessary.  
In the late-eighteenth century it was unimaginable to have a court system run 
entirely based upon legislative commands.  The nature of contemporary courts, the 
Framers own flexible approach to courts, and the explicit inclusion of federal courts 
of law and equity suggest that the new federal judiciary retained the power to act as 
contemporary courts did when confronted with legislative gaps. 
B.   The Judiciary, Process and Crimes Acts 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 380-81 (2002) (noting that “the Framers 
did not eliminate the ability of judges to respond to violations of law with flexible and broad equitable 
remedies but merely incorporated such equitable power into the normal judicial decisionmaking process”). 
166
  See, e.g., Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law, Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1231-62 
(1985). 
167
  Consider Stewart Jay’s description: 
 
Delegates to the Convention had addressed the specific grants of jurisdiction, not the form of their 
exercise.  Much as state constitutional conventions had left the duties of courts undefined, in the 
expectation that they would continue operating as always, the Framers referred only to “the 
judicial power of the United States.”  They probably anticipated that federal courts would act in 
the way courts were accustomed to operating, exercising all functions and powers which Courts 
were at that time in the judicial habit of exercising.  Congress could control the extent of lower 
court jurisdiction, and accordingly “that general sense of justice pervading the Union . . . would 
depend upon the wisdom of the legislatures who are to organize it . . . .” 
 
Id. at 1262 (quoting 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note __, at 258 (Charles Pinckney, South Carolina 
Ratification Convention)). 
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While these Acts do establish legislative control over the form and processes 
of the federal judiciary, they also establish that Congress expected the new federal 
judiciary to behave as Anglo-American courts had for years: they had the flexibility 
to fill in the inevitable gaps in the new statutory framework.  In some places this 
flexibility was explicitly granted by Congress and in others it was implied.  The 
combination of the express and implied grants of flexibility support this Article’s 
thesis that Congress had plenary power over the shape and processes of the courts, 
but that courts had interstitial power, subject to congressional overrule. 
 As noted above, a trio of early statutes defined the nature and structure of 
the federal judiciary.168  Congress took three quite distinct approaches to procedure 
in these laws.  In some cases Congress was quite explicit and offered clear 
boundaries to the federal courts.  In other areas Congress granted clear discretion to 
the new courts.  Lastly, in criminal procedure Congress was almost completely 
silent.  The silence on criminal procedure is especially important.  Congress’ silence 
strongly suggests that there was no requirement of an explicit grant of rulemaking 
power across the board to federal courts.  To argue otherwise suggests that 
Congress created new criminal laws without any way to prosecute them. 
The first criminal law of the United States was substantially shorter than the 
first Judiciary Act and offered very limited explicit procedural guidance.169  The Act 
lists a series of criminal violations and possible punishments, but says almost 
nothing about the process for trying these cases, although it does refer (without 
elaboration) to procedural steps like “presentment or indictment.”  These 
                                                        
168
  See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
169
  The Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112. 
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references suggest that Congress expected the federal courts to try these cases 
according to contemporary common law procedures, but the Act does not say so 
explicitly.170  In short, Congress did not prescribe the great bulk of criminal 
procedure, nor did Congress explicitly grant federal courts discretion to create this 
procedure or to follow existing law.171  Thus, at least for criminal law it cannot be 
true that Congress thought that courts could only exercise procedural power 
explicitly granted by Congress, because no such explicit grant existed.  Courts 
naturally filled in the details afterwards.172 
Congress explicitly granted substantial discretion in other areas.  In cases at 
equity Congress required the courts to proceed according to the existing law,173 
which allowed judges substantial leeway.174  Section 17 of the Judiciary Act also 
explicitly granted federal courts broad discretion “to make and establish all 
necessary rules for the orderly conducting business of said courts, provided such 
rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States.”175   
The broad grants of rulemaking and contempt powers in Section 17 may lend 
credence to the idea that federal courts would not have had any such powers 
without an explicit congressional grant of authority.176  Nevertheless, Section 17 
likely merely restates powers that would have existed regardless of congressional 
                                                        
170
  Id. at §§ 19-20, 1 Stat. 112, 116-17 (describing the prosecution of perjury).  
171
  Similarly, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 described the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, 
but stated no procedures for those cases.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81.  The 
Supreme Court created their own processes in those cases and upheld their power to do so in Chisolm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).   
172
  GOEBEL, supra note __, at 608-613. 
173
  Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94.  
174
  Theodore K. Cheng, Invading an Article III Court's Inherent Equitable Powers: Separation of Powers 
and the Immediate Termination Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
969, 1007-10 (1999).  
175
  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83. 
176
  See Barrett, supra note __, at 855-58. 
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approval.  Congress’ approach to criminal procedure certainly supports this reading.  
Likewise, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act outlined the Supreme Court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction under Article III.177  Much of Section 13 is simply a restatement of 
Article III, so the Judiciary Act included other restatements of existing powers. 
Congress also explicitly limited federal court discretion in several procedural 
categories.  Most notably, Congress explicitly instructed the courts to follow state 
procedure in cases at law178 and also changed some existing procedures.179 
 Thus Congress’ three approaches to procedure well track this Article’s theory 
of inherent powers.  In some areas Congress explicitly limited court discretion in 
ways fundamentally inconsistent to a claim of constitutional judicial control over 
procedure.  In other areas Congress explicitly allowed broad court discretion.  These 
grants suggest a congressional comfort with common law process and flexible 
courts.  Lastly, in criminal cases, Congress left the courts largely to their own devices 
and did not explicitly state how courts should proceed at all.  In the face of 
congressional silence, courts filled in the blanks. 
C.   Early Case Law 
Federal courts certainly behaved as if they had interstitial power to act when 
Congress had not in the earliest cases involving court procedures.  Courts answered 
questions as they arose in individual cases.180  Some district courts also made rules 
                                                        
177
  Compare Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 83 with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
178
  Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94.  
179
  See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
180
  David Engdahl canvasses some contemporary cases to reach the same conclusion: 
 
About many matters, however, no standing rules were made, and when such matters arose, the 
earliest federal judges simply proceeded like judges traditionally had.  For example, no statute 
addressed how many persons should be summoned as a panel from which trial jurors should be 
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about what pleas would be allowed, the time limit for pleas, and the order cases 
would be called for trial.181 
The Supreme Court did the same in its early cases.  For example, in United 
States v. Marchant, two capital defendants asked to be tried separately.  The Court 
declared that such a procedure was “not provided for by any act of Congress; and, 
therefore, if the right can be maintained at all, it must be as a right derived from the 
common law, which the Courts of the United States are bound to recognize and 
enforce.”182   The Court then held that the decision to sever the trials was at the 
court’s discretion.183  
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, did not deal with process or service 
when the Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction.184  In the first cases the 
Supreme Court acted according to its own discretion without comment,185 and it 
was not until Chisolm v. Georgia186 that the Supreme Court expressly addressed the 
question.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
chosen; Justice Paterson at Circuit concluded that the number was discretionary with the court as it 
was at the common law.  No statutory authorization was deemed requisite for the composition and 
use of grand juries, or for committing accused persons and taking bail.  The Justices at Circuit 
never hesitated for lack of statutory authorization to grant continuances in their discretion.  
Likewise, the right to inquire by what authority an attorney acted on his purported client's behalf 
was regarded as “inherent in all courts,” as was the prerogative to enforce courtroom decorum and 
to punish contumacy and contempt. 
 
Engdahl, supra note __, at 86-88 (citing United States v. Insurgents, 26 F. Cas. 499, 500 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) 
(No. 15,443); United States v. Hill, 26 F. Cas. 315 (C.C.D. Va. 1809) (No. 15,364); Hurst v. Hurst, 12 F. 
Cas. 1028 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 6,929); King of Spain v. Oliver, 14 F. Cas. 577, 578 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) 
(No. 7,814)); see also Gilchrest v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355, 362 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (N0. 
5420) (stating that the power to grant a writ of mandamus exists even in the absence of an explicit statutory 
grant of power). 
181
  See DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 36 (1971). 
182
  United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 480, 480 (1827). 
183
  Id. 
184
  Cf. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 83. 
185
  GOEBEL, supra note __, at 725. 
186
  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
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The State of Georgia objected to the service of process.  Attorney General 
Randolph (the former governor of Virginia and the influential founder who had 
presented the Virginia plan and served on the Committee of Detail) argued the case 
in his private capacity.187  Randolph admitted that the form of process was not 
prescribed by statute.  Nevertheless, Randolph defended the Court’s procedure: 
“The mode, if it be not otherwise prescribed by law, or long usage, is in the 
discretion of the Court; and here that discretion must operate.”188  The Court 
adopted this argument with one dissent.189  
Note how Randolph’s description of the Court’s discretion in this case tracks 
the inherent power described by this Article: the court has discretion, unless 
“otherwise prescribed by law,” i.e. unless Congress has spoken in the area.  
Supporters of a constitutional inherent powers doctrine point to Chisolm as an early 
example of inherent powers at work.190  Nevertheless, Chisolm shows an interstitial 
power at best, the power to fill a gap left by Congress, and Chisolm explicitly 
recognizes Congress’ power to act to the contrary if Congress so chose.191  Joseph 
Story’s Commentaries also support the concept that although Congress has plenary 
Article I power over the judiciary, courts retain “certain incidental powers,” without 
any Act of Congress, i.e. interstitial power.192 
                                                        
187
  Apparently Randolph’s “official emoluments [as Attorney General] were so meager that his living 
depended upon the effectiveness with which he represented private clients.”  GOEBEL, supra note __, at 
726.  
188
  Chisolm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 428. 
189
  Id. at 479. 
190
  See Pushaw, supra note __, at 840;  
191
  Chisolm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 428-29. 
192
  STORY, supra note __, at § 1768.  These incidental powers are not superior to Congress’ authority in the 
area.  See id. at § 1752.  St. George Tucker’s American version of Blackstone’s Commentaries similarly 
noted that courts should apply the common law “whenever the written law is silent.”  1 BLACKSTONE'S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL 
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III.   THE LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL POWER 
 With this understanding of the nature and source of congressional and 
judicial power in this area, we turn to the constitutional limits on those powers. 
 A. Limits on Congress’ Power 
 So far this Article has described Congress’ authority in this area as “near 
plenary,” which means that Congress is much more powerful than recent 
scholarship and case law suggest.  There are still limits on Congress’ authority.  Most 
previous scholars have looked to the words “judicial power” and “courts” in Article 
III and found in those terms a limitation on Congress’ power to destroy or impair 
any power deemed necessary to the exercise of all other powers.193  Leo Levin and 
Anthony Amsterdam made perhaps the classic statement of this approach: “There 
are spheres of activity so fundamental and so necessary to a court, so inherent in its 
very nature as a court, that to divest it of its absolute command within these spheres 
is to make meaningless the very phrase judicial power.”194  While this sounds like a 
relatively modest limit on congressional action, the list of “necessary” and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 429 (St. George Tucker 
ed., Phila., William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803).  Amy Barrett has gathered similar 
contemporary federal case law.  See Barrett, supra note __, at 163 & n.67. 
193
  Robert Pushaw calls these constitutional inherent powers “implied indispensible powers,” granted under 
Article III’s use of the terms “judicial power” and “courts” and asserts that because “the Constitution grants 
federal judges implied indispensible powers, it surely does not authorize Congress to destroy or impair 
them.”  Pushaw, supra note __, at 847-48.  Likewise William Ryan expressed that the words “the judicial 
power” grant federal courts the right to decide cases unmolested by “undue interference.”  Ryan, supra note 
__, at 785-95. 
194
  A. Leo Levin & Anthony Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in 
Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30 (1958). 
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“inherent” powers inevitably grows until it seems that Courts have a substantial 
power over Congress.195 
The appropriate limit on any congressional act is whether it is “necessary 
and proper for carrying into execution”196 the judicial power.197  Thus Article I, and 
not Article III, is the check on congressional power over court procedure or 
sanctions. 
  The test under the necessary and proper clause is well known and 
originated in McCulloch v. Maryland:198 “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit 
of the constitution, are constitutional.”199  Later cases have explained that federal 
statutes need only be “rationally related” to the implementation of a constitutionally 
enumerated power.200  The Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power over 
the “choice of means” and “[i]f it can be seen that the means adopted are really 
calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they 
                                                        
195
  For example, Stephen Burbank has correctly noted that Robert Pushaw’s definition of “implied 
indispensible powers [is] very broad indeed.”  Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1686 n.31 (2004). 
196
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
197
  David Engdahl agrees with this Article that the Necessary and Proper Clause, and not anything in 
Article III, is the source of, and the limit to, congressional power in this area. Engdahl, supra note __, at 
90-133.  Nevertheless, Engdahl argues that the limit provided by the Necessary and Proper Clause in the 
inherent powers area should be substantially greater than in other areas and that in assessing the 
constitutionality of congressional acts in this area courts should not apply the traditional rational basis 
review.  Instead, “it seems highly appropriate for the judiciary to make its own judgment whether [the 
judicial power] is actually facilitated, or instead impeded, by any congressional act purporting to help.”  Id. 
at 162. 
198
  17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
199
 Id. at 421. 
200
  See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (using the term “means-ends rationality” to 
describe the necessary relationship). 
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conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means adopted 
and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.”201 
Recognizing the Necessary and Proper Clause as the limit on Congress’ power 
grants Congress much, much greater liberty in the area of inherent power than has 
been previously thought.  In short, unless a congressional act is demonstrably 
disconnected to, or runs against the Article III judicial power, Congress has the 
power to choose amongst the best means for achieving the “carrying into execution” 
of the judicial power. 
This understanding does provide a real limit on Congress and answers the 
objection that if the words “judicial power” or “courts” do not constrain Congress, 
Congress could wreak havoc upon the judiciary.  That said, concerns over whether 
Congress might eliminate the contempt power or destabilize procedure to punish 
the judiciary seem somewhat overblown.  Congress would not need to search very 
hard for constitutional ways to cripple the federal judiciary if it so chose to do so, as 
Congress unquestionably has the power to disestablish the entire lower federal 
judiciary or to defund the Supreme Court (except for the fixed judicial salaries).202 
                                                        
201
  Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-548 (1934).  A Justice Kennedy concurrence in United 
States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1965-67 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) argues for a more muscular 
version of this test in the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause: “The rational basis referred to in the 
Commerce Clause context is a demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstration.”   
202
  Consider a similar point from Professor Charles Black about congressional control over the executive 
branch:  
 
The powers of Congress are adequate to the control of every national interest of any importance, 
including all those with which the president might, by piling inference on inference, be thought to 
be entrusted. And underlying all the powers of Congress is the appropriations power, the power 
that brought the kings of England to heel.  My classes think I am trying to be funny when I say 
that, by simple majorities, Congress could at the start of any fiscal biennium reduce the president's 
staff to one secretary for answering social correspondence, and that, by two-thirds majorities, 
Congress could put the White House up at auction.  But I am not trying to be funny; these things 
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B.   Limits on Judicial Power 
Just as strict necessity has been described as a check on congressional power 
over inherent authority, necessity has also been suggested as a limit on judicial 
power.  The Court has occasionally quoted United States v. Hudson203 to the effect 
that the inherent powers are those powers “necessary to the exercise of all 
others.”204  William Van Alstyne and Robert Pushaw have likewise argued that 
absolute necessity is a requirement for the exercise of inherent powers.205 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never required strict necessity and the 
list of approved inherent and supervisory powers clearly includes activities not 
strictly necessary to court survival.206  The Supreme Court has also regularly 
warned against “overreaching” in this area207 and has at times suggested that 
inherent powers of “long unquestioned” vintage are favored,208 but has been 
relatively silent on any hard boundaries.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
are literally true, and the illustrations are useful for marking the limits – or the practical lack of 
limits – on the power of Congress over the power of the president. 
 
Charles Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 13, 
15-16 (1974). 
203
  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
204
  Id. at 34. 
205
  See Van Alstyne, supra note __, at 128-29 (arguing that any claimed inherent power “broader than a 
power deemed indispensible to enable a court to proceed with a given case appears to require statutory 
support”); Pushaw, supra note __, at 847 (asserting that “the Constitution limits implied authority to cases 
of genuine necessity”). 
206
  See infra note __ and accompanying text. 
207
  Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823-24 (1996) is typical:  
 
The extent of these [inherent] powers must be delimited with care, for there is a danger of 
overreaching when one branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction 
from the others, undertakes to define its own authority.  In many instances the inherent powers of 
the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule.  Principles of deference counsel 
restraint in resorting to inherent power, and require its use to be a reasonable response to the 
problems and needs that provoke it. 
208
  Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426-27 (1996). 
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There are several limitations on these judicial powers.  First and foremost, it 
is critical that the judiciary recognizes Congress’ superior power in this area and act 
accordingly.  Constitutionally speaking the single best check on the judiciary is 
Congress’ power to change or overrule any use of the inherent power under the 
necessary and proper clause.   
Second, federal courts may not utilize any power outside of that power 
granted in the term “judicial power.”  Nevertheless, as noted above, the Framers 
understood the grant of the judicial power to courts to be a flexible one and 
expected courts to be mutable over time.  Thus, as long as the inherent power 
granted has not been foreclosed by an existing act of Congress and is reflective of 
the judicial power – i.e. helpful to the deciding of cases – courts are empowered to 
act, as long as they understand that Congress can always fix what it does not like.209 
Last, the Court’s repeated admonition to step lightly in forming new 
supervisory or inherent power rules is likewise helpful advice, if not any firm 
limitation.  It is true that Congress can overrule these decisions as it sees fit, but one 
should not count on Congress (or the public) to notice or act in a relatively obscure 
area, so reticence is certainly preferable.  
It may strike foes of judicial overreaching as worrisome to allow courts such 
broad latitude in this area.  I have two responses to that objection.  First, the real 
danger with inherent powers is the assertion of a broad area of constitutionally 
                                                        
209
  Alternatively, one could require Courts to establish that their proposed action is consistent with the 
inherent powers of common law courts circa the late-eighteenth century.  This approach would best satisfy 
originalists and would offer a firmer check on judicial behavior.  The difficulty with this approach is the 
uncertainty of ascertaining exactly what inherent powers courts had at the time of the framing with any 
certainty.  Better to recognize the general, flexible approach of common law courts at the time. Such courts 
reacted to new procedural hurdles by filling in the blanks on a discretionary basis.  Modern Article III 
courts exercising the judicial power should likewise be allowed flexibility. 
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protected judicial power.  If and when the Court decides to invalidate an Act of 
Congress under such a supposed constitutional power there will be no way to 
reverse that decision short of a constitutional amendment.  Thus, it is critical that 
the Court understands the breadth of congressional power in this area and not 
overrule a valid congressional Act in an essentially irreversible manner.   
Second, even a cursory review of the decisions in this area establishes that 
courts feel few, if any, limits on their power.210  If courts did limit their forays to 
interstitial areas where Congress has not spoken, then the power would be 
functionally contained, given the opposing breadth of the federal rules and statutes 
that govern the federal judiciary.  The real danger is courts disregarding Congress, 
not courts acting when Congress has remained silent. 
IV. THIS DUAL UNDERSTANDING BEST EXPLAINS THE COURT’S INHERENT POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE  
 
                                                        
210
  Here is a partial list of inherent powers drawn from Anclien, supra note __, at 44-48: 1) the power to 
stay an action pending the completion of a related action in another court; 2) ordering consolidation of 
cases during or before trial; 3) requiring defense counsel either to commit to a firm trial date or withdraw; 
4) determining the order in which to hear and decide pending issues; 5) designating attorneys to handle 
pretrial activity; 6) limiting the length of pretrial hearings; 7) setting a time limit for parties to acquire a 
lawyer; 8) requiring counsel who entered a general appearance to serve in a standby capacity; 9) invoking 
forum non conveniens; 10) requiring parties to have a representative with full settlement authority available 
during pretrial conferences; 11) interrupting counsel and setting time limits; 12) limiting the number of 
expert witnesses who may testify; 13) declaring parties who were absent from docket call ready for trial; 
14) altering common law rules of procedure; 15) excluding evidence that would be unfair to admit; 16) 
permitting the taking and filing of post-trial depositions; 17) refusing to subpoena witnesses for indigent 
civil litigants who cannot tender fees; 18) implementing discovery procedures in habeas cases; 19) 
requiring the prosecution to produce the previously recorded statements of its witnesses; 20) appointing 
amici curiae on their own motion; 21) compel the government to submit a memorandum of law; 22) 
dismissing a case for missing a pretrial conference; 23) ordering an attorney to pay the government the cost 
of empanelling a jury for one day; and 24) punishing an individual for the unauthorized practice of law.   
 
A similarly fulsome list of supervisory authority powers can be found in Beale, supra note __, at 1456-61. 
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A main advantage of this theory of inherent powers is that it does a better job 
of explaining the Court’s own jurisprudence than theories reliant on strong 
constitutional inherent powers.  From Hudson and Bollman forward the Supreme 
Court has regularly referred to necessary inherent powers that cannot be trampled 
by Congress.  Nevertheless, an examination of the cases themselves establishes that 
the Court has never actually overruled an act of Congress under this inherent 
powers scheme, despite significant congressional incursions.  
A.   The Three Categories of Inherent Power Cases 
The Court’s inherent power cases could theoretically be grouped into four 
categories.  One of the potential categories – cases where the Court has overruled a 
congressional act – is notably absent, although some recent lower court opinion 
suggest some federal courts may be verging into this territory, as discussed in 
Section IV.B.5 below.  The existing Supreme Court cases can be divided into three 
categories: 1) cases recognizing that existing federal statutes, rules or decisional law 
foreclose the exercise of inherent authority, i.e. cases explicitly recognizing 
congressional authority; 2) cases allowing uses of inherent powers in areas of 
congressional silence; and 3) cases where Congress has arguably spoken in the area, 
but the Court finds wiggle room to uphold the use of the inherent power.  
The hardest cases to square are category three cases where the Court has 
found inherent authority to act in an area where Congress has arguably spoken.  
Nevertheless, even in these cases the Court has never explicitly claimed a power 
superior to Congress.  Instead, the Court has always found that Congress has not 
foreclosed the inherent power at issue.  In other words, the Court itself thinks there 
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are only two categories of inherent powers decisions: cases where the Court has 
followed congressional direction and cases where Congress has been silent and the 
federal judiciary was empowered to act in the interstices.211   
1.  Cases Where the Court Recognizes Congressional Authority 
The best examples of this category involve the oldest claimed inherent power 
– contempt.  From Hudson forward the Supreme Court has repeatedly announced a 
core constitutional inherent contempt power and warned Congress that the Court 
could overturn a congressional act.  Michaelson v. United States,212 is an excellent 
example: 
That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been 
many times decided and may be regarded as settled law.  It is essential to the 
administration of justice.  The courts of the United States, when called into 
existence and vested with jurisdiction over and subject, at once become 
possessed of the power.  So far as the inferior federal courts are concerned, 
however, it is not beyond the authority of Congress . . . but the attributes 
which inhere in that power and are inseparable from it can neither be 
abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative.213  
 
This language and sentiment has been repeated throughout the last hundred 
years.214   
 Nevertheless, the cases themselves do not actually demonstrate this power in 
practice.  To the contrary, the Court has never invalidated a congressional act 
limiting the contempt power as a violation of federal court inherent authority.  
                                                        
211
  Note that grouping the cases in this manner perfectly describes the dual nature of the inherent powers: 
Congress has near plenary power to control, but the courts have broad powers to act in the absence of a 
congressional mandate. 
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  266 U.S. 42 (1924). 
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  Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 65-66. 
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  See, e.g., Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 799 (1987); Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 43 
(1991).  For an argument that the contempt power is not strictly necessary to court operations despite the 
the Court’s proclamations to the contrary, see Richard C. Brautigam, Constitutional Challenges to the 
Contempt Power, 60 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1513, 1514-22 (1972).  
 58
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 explicitly granted federal courts the 
power “to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all 
contempts of authority.”215  This relatively unfettered grant of the contempt power 
lasted until 1831, when the House and Senate brought impeachment proceedings 
against federal judge James Peck for an alleged abuse of the contempt power.216  
Peck had imprisoned and disbarred a lawyer who had published a critique of a Peck 
judicial opinion while the case was on appeal.217  Peck’s defense was that the 
common law allowed contempt in exactly this circumstance and that if Congress 
disapproved, Congress had the power to change the law.218  Blackstone and other 
contemporary authorities supported Peck’s defense.219 
Judge Peck was acquitted,220 but the outcry over the broad use of the 
contempt power led Congress to significantly limit the contempt power in federal 
courts.  Congress passed an Act curtailing the discretion over contempt and limiting 
the power to actions in or very near the court itself. 221  
By limiting the contempt power to misbehavior in court “or so near thereto 
as to obstruct the administration of justice,” Congress actually substantially 
curtailed both the previous, basically unfettered grant of contempt power in the 
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Judiciary Act of 1789, and the practice of contemporary courts.  The Third Edition of 
Chancellor James Kent’s famous Commentaries on American Law decried the Act as 
“a very considerable, if not injudicious abridgement of the immemorially exercised 
discretion of the courts in respect to contempts.”222  Kent nevertheless expressed no 
doubt that Congress had the power to so constrict the contempt power.223 
 Contemporary lower federal courts applied the statute faithfully and 
recognized Congress’ power to pass the law: “this is an inferior court within the 
provision of the constitution, it is created by the laws, with such powers only as 
congress has deemed it proper to confer” and thus “[t]here can be no doubt of the 
constitutional power of congress to act upon this subject, as far as respects our 
courts.”224   
In 1873 the constitutionality of the Act reached the Supreme Court in Ex 
Parte Robinson.225  The gap in time between the Act’s passage and Robinson alone 
establishes that contemporary courts had no doubt of Congress’ power in this area.  
Robinson begins by noting that the “power to punish for contempts is inherent in all 
courts [and that the] moment the courts of the United States were called into 
existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of 
this power.”226   
Nevertheless, the Court did not hesitate to uphold the Act and Congress’ 
power to restrict the contempt power, at least as to the lower federal courts, noting 
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that as to whether the Act “applies to the Circuit and District Courts there can be no 
question.  These courts were created by act of Congress.  Their powers and duties 
depend upon the act calling them into existence, or subsequent acts extending or 
limiting their jurisdiction.”227   
There was no doubt that the Act of 1832 significantly restricted the common 
law contempt power.228  Nevertheless, the Court recognized Congress’ Article I 
power over the contempt power.  Every congressional impingement on the 
contempt power has likewise been upheld.  United States v. Michaelson229 upheld an 
Act that required courts to try any contempt of court that was also an independent 
violation of a criminal law before a jury.230  Like the change upheld in Robinson, 
contemporary commentators were quite critical of requiring juries in some 
contempt actions.231  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court approved of the 
restriction.232  The power of contempt is now well defined and heavily regulated by 
Congress.233 
Another example is the Court’s decision to allow some congressional 
authority in the area of lawyer admission.  As early as the 1824 case of Ex Parte 
Burr,234 the Supreme Court has treated the power to suspend or disbar attorneys as 
an inherent power on the same level as the contempt power, one that “ought to be 
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exercised with great caution, but which is, we think, incidental to all Courts, and is 
necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the respectability of the 
profession.”235  This power has been regularly listed among the inherent powers 
ever since.236  This is also the inherent power enforced most jealously and 
aggressively by state supreme courts over their respective state legislatures.237   
Nevertheless, the Court has expressed a willingness to allow legislative 
control in this area as well.  In Ex Parte Garland238 the Court allowed a former 
lawyer who had served on the side of the Confederacy, but received a presidential 
pardon, to avoid a constitutional oath meant to bar former Confederate 
sympathizers from practicing in the federal courts.239  The Court held that the 
pardon obviated the need for the oath, but noted that “[t]he legislature may 
undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for the office, to which he must conform, as it 
may, where it has exclusive jurisdiction, prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of 
any of the ordinary avocations of life.”240   
In three recent cases the Court has barred lower court uses of inherent 
authority when the claimed inherent power was used to disregard an applicable 
federal statute, rule, or judicial decision.  The rationale in these cases comes from 
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Thomas v. Arn:241 “[e]ven a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power . . . is 
invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions.”242   
In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,243 the district court attempted to use 
its inherent powers to circumvent the harmless-error inquiry required by Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a).  The Court held that a federal court could not 
simply choose to disregard an otherwise valid Rule of Criminal Procedure under its 
inherent powers:  
It follows that Rule 52 is, in every pertinent respect, as binding as any statute 
duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts have no more discretion to 
disregard the Rule's mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or 
statutory provisions.  The balance struck by the Rule between societal costs 
and the rights of the accused may not casually be overlooked because a court 
has elected to analyze the question under the supervisory power.244 
 
A federal court thus has no power to disregard a clearly applicable federal rule, 
especially because the rule is on a par with “statutory” provisions. 
In Carlisle v. United States,245 the district court granted a defendant’s 
untimely post-verdict judgment of acquittal in violation of the express terms of Rule 
29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The Court recognized that pursuant 
to their inherent powers, federal courts “‘may, within limits, formulate procedural 
rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress.  Whatever the 
scope of this ‘inherent power,’ however, it does not include the power to develop 
rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”246   
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  517 U.S. 416 (1996). 
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The Court has likewise upheld many congressional impingements upon areas 
frequently claimed as areas of inherent authority.  For example, in Sibbach v. Wilson 
& Co.,247 the Court upheld the new Rules Enabling Act (which granted federal courts 
considerable power in drafting uniform rules of procedure) by explicitly stating 
Congress’ authority in the rule-making area: “argument touching the broader 
questions of Congressional power . . . is foreclosed.  Congress has undoubted power 
to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that 
power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not 
inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United States.”248 
The reasoning in Sibbach has only become more salient as Congress has 
taken a heavier hand in federal court rules.  Stephen Burbank has very persuasively 
argued that Congress has exercised has substantial authority in rule-making, and 
has made substantial changes to the rules governing, civil court procedure,249 
habeas procedure,250 criminal procedure,251 and evidence.252 
2.  Cases of Congressional Silence 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
as the result of “a flagrantly illegal search.”  The search itself, however, did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, so the district court granted the suppression motion under its inherent authority.  Id. at 731-32. 
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247
  312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
248
  Id. at 9-10 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1, 21 (1825)). 
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The seminal case is In re Peterson,253 which allowed a federal court to appoint 
an auditor to help decide the case at the expense of the parties.254  One of the 
questions before the Court was whether this appointment was allowable in the 
absence of express congressional authority: “There is here . . . no legislation of 
Congress which directly or by implication forbids the court to provide for such 
preliminary hearing and report.  But, on the other hand, there is no statute which 
expressly authorizes it.”255  Under these circumstances “[c]ourts have (at least in the 
absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with 
appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties.”256 
This decision is notable for two reasons.  First, it is telling that as of 1920 a 
federal court’s power to act in the absence of express constitutional authorization in 
this manner was unclear.  This speaks volumes about the relative weakness of the 
inherent power doctrine for the first 130 years of the federal judiciary.257  From 
Peterson forward federal courts have acted regularly (some might say too regularly) 
without congressional authority.  As of 1920, however, the inherent powers 
doctrine basically consisted of limited dicta in a few cases.  Second, even in stating 
this power, Peterson was at pains to note that Congress retains plenary power over 
this sort of activity and could pass a statute regulating or eliminating it.258 
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The various “supervisory authority” generally fit under this category as well.  
McNabb v. United States,259 decided in 1943, was the first supervisory power case.260  
The Supreme Court claimed a “supervisory authority over the administration of 
justice in the federal courts” and held that confessions gained as a result of 
prolonged detention in violation of various federal statutes must be suppressed 
under this power.261  This was not the first time that the Court had suppressed 
evidence gained in violation of a federal statute,262 but it was the first time it 
announced a supervisory power over federal criminal procedure or the 
investigation of federal crimes.  Thus, McNabb and its companion case, Mallory v. 
United States,263 announced a substantial change in the Court’s relationship with 
federal criminal law and investigations.264 
A break in past practice like McNabb does not occur in a vacuum.  McNabb 
was a culmination of years of concern over federal law enforcement tactics and the 
suddenly burgeoning role of federal criminal law.  During the first 100 years of the 
United States, federal criminal prosecutions were few and appeals to the Supreme 
Court were not even allowed by statute until 1889.265  This all changed with 
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prohibition and other expansions of federal criminal prosecutions.  Between 1901 
and 1932 the number of federal criminal cases quintupled.266  On top of the growth 
in the number of prosecutions there was a growing concern over abusive law 
enforcement tactics like wiretapping and coercive interrogations.  Justice Brandeis 
famously opposed these tactics in a series of dissents from the 1920s.267 
Moreover, the Court was in the very early stages of its new role as the central 
authority on federal rules and procedures.  In 1933 the Court claimed an authority 
to centralize and modernize the federal common law rules of evidence in Funk v. 
United States.268  Funk was quite explicit that “[o]f course, Congress has that power 
[to change the rules of evidence] but, if Congress fail to act” the Court could act on 
its own to modernize the rules of evidence.269  
In 1934 Congress first granted the Court the power to create the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure,270 which were adopted in 1938.271  The Rules of Civil 
Procedure were viewed as a success and in 1940 Congress authorized the Court to 
create uniform rules of criminal procedure as well.272  As such, the Court’s 
conception of a “supervisory authority” was at least partially based on congressional 
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grants of power and a shifting view of the Supreme Court’s role in the federal 
judiciary. 
Moreover, McNabb quite explicitly states that it is not a constitutional 
decision (and thus beyond the purview of Congress)273 and goes to great lengths to 
argue that the case generates out of the federal laws requiring federal law 
enforcement officers to take arrestees “immediately . . . before a committing 
officer.”274  The last paragraph of the decision notes that the decision arises out of 
“respect [for] the policy which underlies Congressional legislation.”275  McNabb does 
not explicitly state that Congress could overrule the decision if it chose, but the 
Court  describes the decision as non-constitutional and its reference to its role in 
defining the federal common law rules of evidence (which it had just recognized 
could be changed by Congress in Funk), strongly suggests that McNabb falls into the 
camp of cases not proscribed by congressional action and subject to congressional 
review and overturn. 
 Congress has, in fact, acted to correct supervisory power decisions on two 
occasions.  In 1957, Congress passed a law narrowing and clarifying the holding in 
Jencks v. United States276 that required the government to provide the defendant 
with written materials from government informants.277   
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In Palermo v. United States,278 the Court upheld the provisions of the Jencks 
Act.  The Court recognized that Jencks was a supervisory power case, i.e. the Jencks 
Court was “[e]xercising our power, in the absence of statutory provision, to 
prescribe procedures for the administration of justice in the federal courts.”279  The 
Court then described the passage of the Act and briskly affirmed Congress’ power to 
change the non-constitutional result in Jencks: Congress “determined to exercise its 
power to define the rules that should govern in this particular area in the trial of 
criminal cases instead of leaving the matter to the lawmaking of the courts” and the 
Court upheld Congress’ power to do so.280  Thus, Jencks, the Jencks Act and Palermo 
well establish that Congress is free to change or alter supervisory authority cases 
(assuming there are no constitutional concerns with the new law) as it sees fit. 
 In 1968, Congress passed a second law aimed at limiting a supervisory power 
case.  Section 3501 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was meant to 
overturn the McNabb-Mallory rule on lengthy detentions by stating that delay in 
bringing a suspect before a magistrate was a “factor” to be considered in 
determining the voluntariness of any confession, but not the “sole criterion.”281  
Section 3501 was also meant to reverse or substantially limit the decisions in 
Miranda v. Arizona282 and Escobedo v. Illinois.283 
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 The different fates of the different parts of Section 1501 well establish 
Congress’ plenary Article I power to alter non-constitutional supervisory power 
cases.  In Corley v. United States284 the Court the Court upheld the congressional 
changes to the McNabb-Mallory rule.285  Corley does not even discuss Congress’ 
power to adjust McNabb-Mallory; it takes that power as a given and proceeds 
immediately to analyzing the meaning of the statute.286   
In comparison, the Court held the portions of the statute that sought to 
restrict the constitutionally based Miranda rule unconstitutional in Dickerson v. 
United States.287  Dickerson quite plainly explains the difference between the 
supervisory authority and constitutional cases: 
The law in this area is clear.  This Court has supervisory authority over the 
federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence 
and procedure that are binding in those tribunals.  However, the power to 
judicially create and enforce nonconstitutional rules of procedure and 
evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of 
Congress.  Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any 
judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by 
the Constitution.288 
 
Thus, the supervisory authority is an interstitial power to act when Congress has not 
spoken and it is subject to overrule by Congress. 
3. Cases Where the Court Elided Congress 
There is a third group of cases that are the most problematic for this Article’s 
vision of weak, non-constitutional inherent authority: cases where a congressional 
act may apply and the Court allows an exercise of inherent authority regardless.  
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Notably, the Supreme Court has never stated that it is attempting to elude 
congressional intent in these cases.  To the contrary, the Court is always careful to 
note that the decision either occupies space untrammeled by Congress or that 
congressional intent to displace inherent authority is unclear.   
The first of these cases is a 1962 case, Link v. Wabash,289 which held that 
federal courts retained the right to sua sponte dismiss a case for failure prosecute, 
despite the fact that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) did not provide that 
power.290  Rule 41(b) allowed involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute upon 
motion of the defendant, with no mention of a court’s power to act sua sponte.291  
The petitioner argued “by negative implication” that Rule 41(b)’s explicit mention of 
a motion by a defendant combined with its silence on sua sponte judicial dismissal 
meant that involuntary dismissals must be initiated by the defendant.292 
In rejecting this argument the Court relied upon the fact that sua sponte 
dismissals have “generally been considered an ‘inherent power’ governed not by 
rule or statute” and the fact that state and federal courts had continued to regularly 
use the sanction, even after the adoption of Rule 41(b).  In light of the historical and 
current use of the power the Court concluded that “[i]t would require a much 
clearer expression of purpose than Rule 41(b) provides for us to assume that it was 
intended to abrogate so well-acknowledged a proposition.”293  
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There are a few ironies about this decision.  First, Link was decided during 
the period where the Court itself had a major and largely unfettered role in drafting 
the Rules, so in assessing the intent behind Rule 41(b) it was actually in large part 
assessing its own intent.  Second, while the Court brushed off the petitioner’s 
argument, it is worth wondering why an inherent power, like the one claimed in this 
case, should survive after the creation of the Rules of Civil Procedure, largely by the 
federal courts themselves.  If the Rules were legislatively drafted, the argument to 
act in the interstices would be much more persuasive than adding inherent powers 
on top of a set of rules drafted largely by the courts themselves. 
Link is the first time the Court stated that Congress needs to make a “much 
clearer expression” in a law to displace an existing inherent power.  The relative 
lateness of this declaration again suggests that earlier Supreme Courts were much 
less protective of judicial inherent powers.  Even more than the dicta in Hudson and 
Bollman about a constitutionally protected core inherent contempt power, it is Link 
and its progeny that suggest some sort of special constitutional status for inherent 
powers.   
Chambers v. NASCO294 expanded on Link’s “clearer expression” language: “we 
do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established 
principles such as the scope of a court's inherent power.”295  In Chambers a district 
court sanctioned a party for bad-faith litigation conduct.  The court imposed these 
sanctions under its inherent powers, rather than Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 
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  501 U.S. 32 (1991). 
295
  Id. at 47. 
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because it found that neither Rule 11 nor § 1927 was sufficient to reach the 
behavior at issue in the case.296 
The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that neither Rule 11 nor § 1927 were 
meant to displace the traditional inherent powers of the court to sanction.297  The 
Court did suggest that:  
when there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be 
adequately sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on 
the Rules rather than the inherent power.  But if in the informed discretion of 
the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may 
safely rely on its inherent power.298   
 
The Court is hardly crystal clear on this point; it also states that a federal court is not 
“forbidden to sanction bad-faith conduct by means of the inherent power simply 
because that conduct could also be sanctioned under the statute or the Rules,” 
assuming the court follows the other due process and factual requirements.299 
These relatively contradictory statements were necessary because the Court 
could not uphold the Chambers sanction if the lower court should have first 
exhausted its remedies under existing rules and statutes, because that court did no 
such thing and the existing rules and statutes offered a wide array of options to 
punish misbehavior.300  
                                                        
296
  Id. at 40-42. 
297
  Id. at 47-49. 
298
  Id. at 50.   
299
  Id. 
300
  The dissent listed multiple options: 
 
By direct action and delegation, Congress has exercised this constitutional prerogative to provide 
district courts with a comprehensive arsenal of Federal Rules and statutes to protect themselves 
from abuse. A district court can punish contempt of its authority, including disobedience of its 
process, by fine or imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 401; award costs, expenses, and attorney's fees 
against attorneys who multiply proceedings vexatiously, 28 U.S.C. § 1927; sanction a party and/or 
the party's attorney for filing groundless pleadings, motions, or other papers, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 
11; sanction a party and/or his attorney for failure to abide by a pretrial order, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 
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Nevertheless, the Court did not want to hold that a court’s inherent powers 
were to be used as a vehicle to simply disregard the applicable rules and statutes.  
Instead, the Court struck a compromise position: in a case where some of the 
behavior would not be reached by the existing statutes and rules a court could use 
the inherent powers to reach all of the behavior at once.301  The Court supplements 
this holding by finding, as it did in Link and other cases, that the rules and statutes 
had not meant to displace the existing inherent powers of courts, but to supplement 
them.302  
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,303 the first modern forum non conviens case, is also a 
case where the Court allows a district court to avoid a seemingly applicable 
congressional jurisdictional statute in favor of an inherent power to dismiss because 
another forum would be more convenient.304  Gulf Oil is also an inherent powers 
                                                                                                                                                                     
16(f); sanction a party and/or his attorney for baseless discovery requests or objections, Fed.Rule 
Civ.Proc. 26(g); award expenses caused by a failure to attend a deposition or to serve a subpoena 
on a party to be deposed, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 30(g); award expenses when a party fails to respond 
to discovery requests or fails to participate in the framing of a discovery plan, Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
37(d) and (g); dismiss an action or claim of a party that fails to prosecute, to comply with the 
Federal Rules, or to obey an order of the court, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 41(b); punish any person who 
fails to obey a subpoena, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 45(f); award expenses and/or contempt damages 
when a party presents an affidavit in a summary judgment motion in bad faith or for the purpose 
of delay, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(g); and make rules governing local practice that are not 
inconsistent with the Federal Rules, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 81. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (power to 
award just damages and costs on affirmance); Fed.Rule App.Proc. 38 (power to award damages 
and costs for frivolous appeal). 
 
Id. at 62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
301
  See id.. at 50. 
302
  See id. at 47-49.  There are other cases in the same vein as Chambers.  Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 
U.S. 752, 764-68 (1980), upheld a court’s inherent power to assess attorneys fees against opposing counsel, 
despite the existence of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927. 
303
  330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
304
  Id. at 840-43. 
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case that resulted in congressional action.  Months after the case Congress 
responded by allowing inter-district transfers in 28 U.S.C. § 1404.305   
While these cases come close to applying inherent powers in the teeth of 
existing congressional actions, it is worth noting that the Court never says that is 
what it is doing.  To the contrary, in each of these cases the Court goes to great 
lengths to reassure that Congress did not intend to dislodge the existing inherent 
power and that the exercise of the inherent power does not violate the statute or 
rule at issue.  Thus, even if these cases show a worrisome disregard for 
congressional authority in their outcomes, the words themselves are perfectly 
consistent with congressional power to shape federal court rules and processes.306 
B. A Brief Word on State Court Inherent Power 
The fact that the Supreme Court has never invalidated a congressional act 
under the inherent powers doctrine is particularly notable given the comparative 
behavior of state supreme courts in this area.  State supreme courts have applied a 
much more muscular inherent powers doctrine.307  State supreme courts have used 
this power to repeatedly overturn legislative acts, especially if an act affects the 
regulation of lawyers.308  Given the comparative example of state courts, the federal 
court reticence in this area is particularly marked.  If the Court needed a model for 
overturning congressional acts, it had many to choose from.  
                                                        
305
  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  For a general discussion of Gulf Oil and this statute, see Lear, supra note __, at 
1148-49. 
306
 Further examples of this category of cases can be found in Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power 
Within a Rules Regime, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 311, 315-19 (2010). 
307
  See Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 453, 462 (2008). 
308
  See Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer Self-Protection: Reflections on the 
LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 361-62 (1998). 
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C. Youngstown’s Taxonomy of Presidential Power 
A close parallel to the inherent power of federal courts are the powers of the 
President.  The Court’s treatment of presidential power has followed this Article’s 
theory quite closely.  The most famous statement is Justice Jackson’s concurrence in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.309  Jackson divided exercises of presidential 
power into three categories: actions authorized by Congress; those neither 
authorized nor prohibited by Congress; and those prohibited by Congress.310   
Each of these three categories suggests a different level of presidential 
authority.  “When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”311  When the 
President acts in absence of congressional authority, “he can only rely upon his own 
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may 
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”312  In the 
interstices Presidential authority can derive support from “congressional inertia, 
indifference or quiescence.”313  Finally, “[w]hen the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its 
                                                        
309
  343 U.S. 579 (1952).  In Youngstown the Court overruled President Truman’s decision to seize steel 
mills without congressional approval in order to guarantee the production of steel during the Korean War.  
Id. at 582-85.  Youngstown  is one of the most famous separation of powers cases, see, e.g., Symposium, 
Youngstown at Fifty, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2002). 
310
  Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
311
  Id. at 635. 
312
  Id. at 637 
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  Id. 
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lowest ebb,” and the Court can sustain his actions “only by disabling the Congress 
from acting upon the subject.”314 
Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence has been adopted by the Court in multiple 
majority opinions since and is the accepted rubric for measuring the 
constitutionality of questionable presidential assertions of power.315  The Court’s 
treatment of presidential authority thus parallels this Article’s theory of judicial 
inherent authority: there are areas where the President can act in the absence of 
congressional authority, especially if Congress has displayed “inertia, indifference or 
quiescence.”316  When the President acts in the teeth of congressional authority 
however, his powers are severely limited: he may only act where Congress cannot 
act at all, a limited set of powers,317 and an analogous set to the pure judicial power 
of deciding cases.318 
D.   Two Different Approaches From the Courts of Appeals  
 
The confusion at the Supreme Court level has led to some outlier cases 
amongst the courts of appeals.  On one extreme there are judges who follow the 
thesis of this Article and hold that inherent powers are prudential in nature and can 
only be used in the absence of another federal rule or law.  Judge Posner has 
described inherent authority as “a residual authority, to be exercised sparingly” and 
                                                        
314
  Id. at 637-638. 
315
  See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523-25 (applying the Jackson test); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (same). 
316
  Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
317
  Examples include the use of force to repel an invasion, see G. Sidney Buchanan, A Proposed Model for 
Determining the Validity of the Use of Force Against Foreign Adversaries Under the United States 
Constitution, 29 HOUSTON L. REV. 379, 398 n. 96 or the power to recognize foreign governments.  See 
Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1635 (2007).  
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  A fuller discussion of Youngstown, Hamdan, and Medellin is beyond the scope of this paper.  In a 
future project I will propose a unified theory of inherent powers utilizing the implied powers of the 
President, Congress itself and the judiciary as a launching point. 
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only to address issues “not adequately dealt with by other rules, [e.g.,] Rules 11 and 
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”319  Judge Easterbook has likewise noted 
that “[t]he supervisory power is part of the common law, and no court has a 
common law power to disregard a rule or statute that was within the authority of 
Congress to enact.”320   
At the other extreme, two recent cases have explicitly stated a requirement of 
clear congressional intent to abrogate inherent powers and have disregarded the 
underlying law in the absence of such a statement.  While these cases do not 
explicitly overrule an Act of Congress, they do suggest that a federal court can 
disregard an applicable federal law under their inherent powers.   
In Lin v. U.S. Department of Justice,321 the Second Circuit addressed 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996,322 which explicitly stripped federal courts of the power to remand cases to the 
Bureau of Immigration Appeals for the taking of additional evidence.323  In Lin the 
Second Circuit did exactly what § 1252(a) barred: it remanded an immigration 
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  Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 390-91 (7th Cir. 2002). 
320
  United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325, 329 (7th Cir.1985); see also United States v. Simpson, 927 
F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, J.) (“The supervisory power simply does not give the courts the 
authority to make up the rules as they go, imposing limits on the executive according to whim or will.”); In 
re United States, 426 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The court's supervisory power does not license it to ignore 
an otherwise valid existing jury plan or to bypass the mechanism provided by statute to alter such plan.”); 
United States v. Thorpe, 471 F.3d 652, 665 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the district court’s grant of discovery 
based upon a claim of inherent power that disregarded contrary statutory and Supreme Court law); 
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir.1998) (rejecting a 
district court’s dismissal of an action as inconsistent with the Federal Rules and “join[ing] other circuits in 
holding that district courts have inherent power to control their dockets, but not when its exercise would 
nullify the procedural choices reserved to parties under the federal rules”); United States v. Washington, 
549 F.3d 905, 912-14 (3rd Cir. 2008) (rejecting argument that a district court has an inherent power to 
vacate its own criminal judgments because of fraud because 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 35 circumscribe such a power). 
321
  473 F.3d 48, 53 (2nd Cir. 2007). 
322
  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
323
  Id. at 52. 
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appeal.  The Second Circuit did so on the agreement of the parties, which does not 
appear to be an exception to the strictures of § 1252(a).324  In dicta the court opined 
that regardless of the agreed remand and despite clear congressional intent to bar 
remand, a court could in fact remand under its inherent authority.325 
The reasoning and ruling in Lin was echoed in Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & 
Karatinos, P.L.326  Sahyers was an FLSA fees case.  Plaintiff Sahyers worked as a 
paralegal for a law firm and claimed unpaid overtime and other FLSA violations.  
After somewhat contentious and drawn out discovery, the defendants offered 
plaintiff a $3500 judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.  Plaintiff 
accepted and plaintiff’s attorney filed for attorney’s fees under the FLSA’s 
mandatory fee provision.    
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  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
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  The quote from Lin is worth reading, just to get a sense of the breadth of the power claimed: 
 
We do not necessarily construe Congress's decision to deprive parties of the § 2347(c) mechanism 
as indication that Congress also intended to take away our inherent power to remand.  If Congress 
had intended to prohibit us from remanding for consideration of new evidence in all instances, it 
could have done so much more clearly.  Instead, IIRIRA by its terms foreclosed only the use of 
the § 2347(c) procedural mechanism under which we could remand on motion of a party.  As we 
have recently stated, “we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from 
established principles such as the scope of a court's inherent power.” Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 
F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991)).  Rather, 
before we will conclude that Congress intended to deprive us of our inherent powers, we require 
“something akin to a clear indication of legislative intent.”  Id.  Moreover, when Congress 
establishes a procedure to limit or cabin our power to take an action in one context that we 
previously could perform in the exercise of our inherent powers, we do not presume that Congress 
intended to eliminate our inherent power to accomplish that result. 
 
Lin, 473 F.3d at 52-55.  The Second Circuit has since cast doubt upon this discussion, see Xiao Xing Ni v. 
Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 261-62 (2nd Cir. 2007), and other circuits have likewise declined to follow it.  See 
Wan Ping Lin v. Mukasey, 303 Fed. Appx. 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2008); Zhen Jiang v. Attorney General of 
United States, 324 Fed. Appx. 196, 198 n.4 (3rd Cir. 2009).   
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  Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., 560 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2009).  Unless noted separately, 
all of the facts and law that follow come from this decision.  See id. at 1242-45.  Please note that I advised 
plaintiff’s counsel pro bono in this case and also helped pro bono on the petition for certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
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 Citing the lawyer’s lack of collegiality in suing a law firm without calling to 
settle the case first, the district court refused to grant any award of attorney’s fees at 
all.327  Like Lin, Sahyers involved a federal court disregarding contrary statutory 
language based on inherent powers.  The FLSA’s fee provision is mandatory and 
contains no exception for lawyer collegiality.328  The Sahyers court evaded the 
statutory language as follows: “Congress was aware of the inherent powers of a 
federal court when enacting the FLSA.  And at least in the absence of very clear 
words from Congress, we do not presume that a statute supersedes the customary 
powers of a court to govern the practice of lawyers in litigation before it.”329 
 Sahyers and Lin thus show a quite muscular vision of federal court inherent 
power: unless Congress has explicitly expressed a desire to abrogate a traditional 
inherent power a court may disregard the congressional act.  A review of the United 
States Code shows that Congress has rarely, if ever, explicitly displaced the inherent 
powers of federal courts.330  Lin and Sahyers make the danger of Supreme Court 
overreaching in this area clear: federal courts can disregard virtually any 
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  See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415-16 & nn. 5 & 6 
(1978) (stating that the statute’s use of the word “shall” rather than “may” directs that a fee award is 
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  Sahyers, 560 F.3d at 1245 n. 6. 
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  A search of the Westlaw database “USC” for the terms “inherent power” /s court returns 29 documents, 
almost all of them from the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure and none explicitly abrogating 
inherent authority in the manner suggested by Lin and Sahyers. 
 
In essence these various cases present two different tests when an exercise of inherent power conflicts with 
a rule or statute.  Some courts ask whether an exercise of inherent authority would conflict with a federal 
statute.  If so, the statute controls.  See, e.g., Hermanos, 313 F.3d at 390-91.  Lin and Sahyers ask whether 
the statute at issue clearly abrogates the claimed inherent authority.  On the surface these tests sound 
similar.  In many cases (Sahyers and Lin included) the choice of test is outcome determinative and the tests 
are markedly distinct in what they require of Congress.   
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congressional act or rule by finding “no clear intent” to dislodge an existing inherent 
power. 
CONCLUSION 
The ramifications of this understanding of inherent powers are quite 
straightforward.  First and foremost, federal courts should more clearly recognize 
Congress’ superior Article I power in this area.  The regular sabre rattling of the 
federal courts, starting with the dicta in Bollman and Hudson, to the effect that there 
is an indeterminate core constitutional inherent power and that Congress should 
beware when legislating in the area, should be repudiated.  This dicta encourages 
broader uses of the inherent powers by lower federal courts and discourages 
Congress from acting in the area.   
Similarly, the Court should consider overruling the portion of Chambers v. 
NASCO that allows a court to exercise its inherent powers despite potentially 
applicable statutes or rules.331  Given Congress’ superior constitutional power 
courts should not act in an area where Congress has spoken.  Courts can, of course, 
continue to work in the interstices amongst the various statutes and rules, but 
cannot choose to exercise an inherent power when an applicable statute or rule is 
available. 
Nor should federal courts require any plain statement of congressional intent 
before finding that a congressional act has displaced an existing inherent power.  
Congress has the superior claim in this area and insofar as Congress has acted, its 
laws should have precedence over any claim of inherent authority.  At a minimum, 
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cases like Sahyers and Lin,332 should not be followed.  Any generally applicable 
statute or rule should trump a court’s inherent powers.   
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  See supra Section IV.C. 
